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Abstract 
This study compares ad valorem and per-unit taxes in public finance and international 
trade and examines the welfare effects of trade cost in general oligopolistic equilibrium 
(GOLE). In chapter two, following Grazzini (2006), the welfare comparison of ad valorem and 
per-unit taxation is conducted in an exchange economy under Cournot competition. It is shown 
that the exceptional result in Grazzini (2006) that a per-unit tax can be welfare superior to an 
ad valorem tax, entirely depends on the form of social welfare function. Furthermore, the 
possibility of the dominance of per-unit taxation is due to the effect of taxation on the 
redistribution of income rather than from any efficiency gain.  
In chapter three, assuming that the home government maximises the tariff revenue, the 
welfare with ad valorem tariff is higher than that with per-unit tariff given the constraint of 
FDI cost. The maximum revenue collected by the home government is always higher with ad 
valorem tariff under Cournot competition. However, under Bertrand competition with 
differentiated products, the maximum revenue with per-unit tariff is higher than that with ad 
valorem tariff if the FDI cost is sufficiently low. This is because the introduction of product 
differentiation and nature of Bertrand competition both intensify the competition and lower the 
prices. 
In chapter four, by using the general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model 
developed by J. Peter Neary, it is shown that social welfare is also U-shaped in the trade cost 
under Cournot competition. The result is in line with Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman 
(1983). In particular, when the trade cost is sufficiently high, a reduction in trade cost will 
increase the competitive wage due to the redistribution of labour, and the equilibrium prices as 
a function of trade costs follows a hump-shaped pattern if the products are homogeneous. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Modelling oligopoly 
Models based on perfect competition dominated mainstream thinking about both 
positive and normative aspects of the trade from its inception in the work of Ricardo (1817). 
Ricardo (1817) outlined the principle of comparative, making an international trade the first 
applied domain of political economy. Traditional trade theory has been developed using models 
of perfect competition in which each firm is short of market power and does not act strategically. 
 The so-called new trade theory attracts a great number of efforts on the implications 
for international trade of imperfectly competitive models. Since 1979, there are two distinct 
directions have been developed to incorporate imperfect competition into international theory, 
which are monopolistically competitive models and oligopolistic models. It is worth noting 
that the former one fascinates a great amount of literature and immediately turns to be the more 
popular one. It is so-called “two and a half theories of trade” in the words of Paul Krugman 
(Peter Neary (2010)). There is also a “new” new trade theory starting with the pioneering work 
by Melitz (2003), assuming that firms within an industry differ in productivity (i.e., firms are 
heterogeneous) and using monopolistic competition . 
In monopolistic competition models, it is natural to make the following three 
assumptions. To begin with, it is assumed that there are no strategic interactions. In other words, 
firms assume that their price will not affect the marginal utility of income of consumers. Due 
to the great number of firms, each firm ignores the effect of other firms’ prices on their demand. 
Meanwhile, with respect to monopoly pricing, each firm confronts a downward-sloping 
demand curve. In terms of the issue of free entry, firms enter the industry until profits are driven 
to zero for all participants. Models of monopolistic competition permit each firm to have a 
finite level of market power but rule out strategic interaction by supposing that firms recognise 
themselves too tiny to influence the prices of others.  
Oligopoly is a market structure in which a market is shared by a small number of large 
firms. These firms have significant influence over the industry. The followings are some real-
life examples of oligopolies in the UK: Six utilities (EDF Energy, Centrica, RWE npower, E.on, 
Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern Energy) share the majority of the UK retail 
electricity market; Four core signal providers (EE, Vodafone, O2 and 3 Mobile) dominate the 
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mobile phone networks; The detergent market is dominated by two companies (Unilever and 
Procter & Gamble). The basic difference between monopolistic competition models and 
oligopolistic competition models is that under oligopoly firms perceive that their action impacts 
the action of their rivals and they perceive that this is known by their rivals and they perceive 
that their rivals know this situation and so on and so forth (i.e. what is the so-called common 
knowledge).  
It is widely acknowledged that embedding oligopoly model in general equilibrium 
suffers a number of severe technical problems1. To begin with, if firms are large in their own 
sector, then the firms can directly affect both economy-wide income and factor prices. 
Consequently, assuming the firms act rationally, they should take this into account in making 
their decisions. Such behaviour is of extreme difficulty to model. In addition, large firms have 
impacts on the cost of living, and rational shareholder should take account of their effect on 
the marginal utility of income when making their decisions. This issue was put forward by 
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), who claim that modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium is 
sensitive to the choice of numeraire. Lastly, according to Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977), it 
is difficult to obtain the resulting reaction functions so that there may be no equilibrium. For 
instance, discontinuous and concave reaction functions may exist in general equilibrium.  
There have been some attempts to embed oligopoly models in general equilibrium. For 
example, Cordella and J Gabszewicz (1997) assume that firms are owned by worker-producers, 
who maximise utility rather than profits. Dierker and Grodal (1999) assume that firms aim at 
maximising shareholders’ wealth, taking account of how their choices influence the deflator 
for nominal wealth. Ruffin (2003a, 2003b) attempts to model oligopoly in general equilibrium 
by assuming a finite number of sectors and firms can set prices in good markets but not in 
factor markets. In other words, the typical agent is assumed to behave schizophrenically, i.e., 
affecting prices as a producer and accepting prices as given as a consumer. Chapter two and 
chapter four model oligopoly in general equilibrium. The analysis of chapter two is cast into a 
particular oligopoly model, in which oligopolists are simultaneously consumers and workers, 
while chapter four adopts the general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model developed by 
Neary (2002b, 2003a, 2003b). 
                                                             
1 Bonanno (1990) provides a comprehensive survey on equilibrium theory with imperfect competition.   
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1.2 Taxes and tariffs under oligopoly 
Taxes are involuntary charged by a government entity in order to finance government 
activities. In general, taxes can be divided into two main categories: direct taxes and indirect 
taxes. Direct taxes such as income tax and wealth tax, are directly paid by the person on whom 
they are imposed. The tax burden is borne by the same person on whom they are levied. Direct 
taxes affect decisions about labour supply, savings, investments, and so forth. In contrast to 
direct taxes, indirect taxes are levied by a government on goods and services. A typical example 
of indirect tax is the consumption tax. The burden can be shifted onto the ultimate consumer 
of the product. An indirect tax may lead to an increase in the price of a good.  
The effect of commodity taxes can differ according to whether the proposed tax is based 
upon the quantity (per-unit tax) or upon the value (ad valorem). An ad valorem tax is a fixed 
percentage of the value of the transaction on which it is imposed. Value added tax (VAT) is a 
typical example of ad valorem taxes. In the UK, VAT is charged at the standard rate of 20% 
on most goods offered for sale2. A reduced rate of 5% is payable on items such as children's 
car seats and gas and electricity. By contrast, a per-unit tax is a tax of a fixed amount on each 
unit of the commodity. Along with the standard rate VAT at 20%, petrol, tobacco, and alcohol 
also have per-unit taxes in the UK: Fuel duty is charged at a fixed rate of 57.95 pence per litre; 
Tobacco duty on cigarettes is charged at 16.5% of the retail price plus £4.34 on a packet of 
twenty; For a pint of 5.0% strength lager, the beer duty is charged at a standard rate of 19.08 
pence litre. 
Chapter two compares two forms of tax in public finance. The welfare comparison 
between per-unit and ad valorem taxation has been a popular subject in the study of public 
finance. In order to study the welfare properties of different forms of taxation, it is of help to 
understand the meaning of over-shifting of a tax and the measurement of social welfare. A 
consumption tax will generally increase the consumer price. Over-shifting occurs when price 
increases by more than the amount of the consumption tax and under-shifting when it increases 
by less. Over-shifting can only happen in the case of imperfect competition. This is because 
firms realise that an increase in the tax will reduce demand for their product and due to the 
existence of market power and strategic behaviour among firms in imperfectly competitive 
                                                             
2 Some things are exempt from VAT, e.g., postage stamps, financial and property. 
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markets, they are able to increase the price more than the increase in tax in order to compensate 
for the potential loss owing to the tax policy. 
With a change in a government policy, some individuals might be better off while others 
might be worse off. In welfare economics, one may consider the following issues: whether the 
allocation of recourses is regarded to be economically efficient or whether the distribution of 
income is considered to be equitable. However, one problem of the evaluation of welfare is that 
the normative judgements cannot be avoided. Social welfare functions are often employed to 
address the problem by assigning weights to different individuals. To be more specific, social 
welfare function is an aggregation mechanism, which determines a social ordering as a function 
of individual ordering. A social welfare function aggregates the level of utility received by 
members of society, and it is a summary of society’s attitudes toward different distributions of 
income and welfare. As individual welfare is increasing in the level of income, social welfare 
is also positively related to each individual’s income. 
It is widely known that, under perfect competition, ad valorem taxation and per-unit 
taxation are equivalent. In imperfect competition, the conventional wisdom suggests that an ad 
valorem tax is welfare superior to a per-unit tax, as the tax revenue received by the government 
is higher with an ad valorem tax if the price is the same with both taxes. Under monopoly, the 
pioneer to propose that these two types of taxation required separate analysis was Cournot 
(1971), writing in the 1830s. Wicksell (1896) put forward that ad valorem taxes dominate per-
unit taxes in the case of constant marginal cost. He argues that an ad valorem tax causes a lower 
consumer price and therefore more production when tax revenue is the same with both taxes. 
This dominance was completely demonstrated, with general cost functions, by Suits and 
Musgrave (1953). In particular, they argued that the government receives lower revenue with 
per-unit taxes than under a method of ad valorem taxes, given that the consumer price and the 
quantity of the monopoly good stayed unchanged. Under oligopoly, Delipalla and Keen (1992) 
confirm the welfare dominance of ad valorem taxation both in the short run with a fixed number 
of firms and the long run with free entry and exit of firms. Skeath and Trandel (1994b) show 
that, under monopoly, ad valorem taxation Pareto dominates (i.e., higher consumer surplus, 
profit and tax revenue) per-unit taxation. In addition, they show that the Pareto dominance of 
ad valorem taxation applies to symmetric Cournot-Nash oligopoly setting when the tax rate 
exceeds a critical level. Grazzini (2006) embeds oligopoly in general equilibrium to compare 
ad valorem and per-unit taxation. In particular, Grazzini (2006) considers an exchange 
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economy with two groups of agents (i.e., consumers and oligopolists) and two types of goods 
(i.e., good 1 and good 2). Consumers behave competitively on the exchange market, and 
initially own good 1. Good 2 can only be produced by oligopolists, using good 1 as input. The 
oligopolists do not own any good initially and behave strategically on the exchange market. 
The aggregate welfare is measured by the sum of welfare of both groups of agents. Grazzini 
(2006) claims that per-unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation when the 
number of oligopolists is sufficiently low compared to the number of consumers. In the 
following analysis in chapter two, I will show that the results Grazzini (2006) are not 
convincing as the welfare ranking entirely depends on the form of social welfare function. 
Besides, if the government imposes a lump-sum transfer in the setting of Grazzini (2006), the 
aggregate welfare is ambiguously higher with ad valorem taxation. It can be concluded that the 
dominance of per-unit tax in Grazzini (2006) is due to the effect of taxation on the redistribution 
of income rather than from any efficiency gain. 
Chapter three examines the welfare comparison between per-unit and ad valorem tariffs 
in international trade. Ad valorem and per-unit tariffs were firstly compared by Hillman and 
Templeman (1985). They show that, when the home country is supplied with imports by a 
foreign monopoly, an ad valorem tariff is welfare superior to a per-unit tariff. The comparison 
of ad valorem and per-unit tariffs under oligopoly starts with Helpman and Krugman (1989). 
They show that an ad valorem tariff welfare dominates a per-unit tariff. Skeath and Trandel 
(1994a) demonstrate that any per-unit tariff can be replaced by a Pareto-dominating ad valorem 
tariff if the home country is supplied by a foreign monopolist. Moreover, they study the case 
when the home country faces a foreign oligopoly and find that the Pareto dominance of an ad 
valorem over a per-unit tariff holds if tariffs are sufficiently large. Unlike most of the relevant 
literature that directly compares the two tariffs, this study introduces a constraint from the 
potential FDI strategy by foreign firms.   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment (e.g., building new facility) made by 
a multinational corporation to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the 
economy. For example, Japanese car firms (e.g., Nissan, Toyota and Honda) had chosen the 
UK as a European base to access the EU market and avoid tariffs. Another example, Apple Inc. 
has FDI in China due to the fact that it has cheap labour, strong economy, and the biggest 
population in the world. According to World Investment Report 2017, the global FDI flows 
reduced by 2 per cent to $1.75 trillion after a strong rise in 2015. The volume is over four times 
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as large as those in 1995 ($0.4 trillion). The report also reveals that global flows are expected 
to increase by about 5 percent in 2017 to almost $1.8 trillion, continuing to $1.85 trillion in 
2018. In particular, in 2016, flows to developing economies decreased by 14 per cent. However, 
FDI still remains the largest and most constant external source of finance for developing 
economies. Flows to developed economies increased by 5 per cent in 2016. As a result, 
developed economies’ share in global FDI inflows rose to 59 per cent. 
FDI can be either greenfield (i.e., a brand new plant is built in the host country) or 
merger and acquisition (i.e., the existing facility was purchased by the multinational 
corporation). Traditional FDI can be divided into two categories: vertical and horizontal FDI. 
Vertical foreign direct investment refers to that the situation when the production process is 
geographically fragmented by stages of production. There are generally two forms of vertical 
FDI: forward and backward. Forward vertical FDI is an investment in a plant aboard that sells 
output for a firm’s domestic production processes, whereas backward vertical FD is an 
investment in a plant aboard that offers input for a firm’s domestic production processes. 
Multinational corporations benefit from vertical FDI by moving different stages of the 
production process to countries with lower costs. Horizontal FDI refers to investment in the 
same industry abroad that the firm operates in at home. It is a strategy to increase market share 
in a global economy and is a more attractive way when the trade costs and government 
intervention are high. In general, FDI is horizontal rather than vertical. This suggests that 
market access is more important than decreasing production costs as a motive for FDI. There 
has been a substantial growth in export-platform FDI globally over the past few decades. This 
type of investment occurs when the output of a foreign affiliate is largely sold in third markets 
rather than in the host markets.    
It is assumed that the foreign firms can supply the domestic market by two alternative 
ways: by exporting or by undertaking FDI. Importantly, the foreign firms will only choose to 
export if it is more profitable than undertake FDI. The tariff revenue collected by the home 
government will be zero if the rate of import tariff is set too high. Therefore, the rate of import 
tariff imposed by the home government will depend on the value of FDI cost. This study will 
compare the maximum tariff revenue and welfare between the two regimes of import tariff 
with the constraint of FDI cost. It is shown that the welfare with ad valorem tariff is higher 
with ad valorem tariff than that with per-unit tariff under both modes of competition. The 
maximum revenue collected by the home government is always higher with ad valorem tariff 
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under Cournot competition. However, the tariff revenue with per-unit tariff can be higher than 
that with ad valorem tariff under Bertrand competition with differentiated products. This is 
because the introduction of product differentiation and nature of Bertrand competition both 
intensify the competition and lower the prices, the tariff revenue with ad valorem tariff will be 
very small when the FDI cost is close to zero. 
1.3 International trade under oligopoly 
Chapter four focuses on how trade costs affect the economy under oligopoly. Brander 
(1981) first presents a reciprocal-markets model to study the welfare effects of trade costs under 
Cournot duopoly. The basic structure of the reciprocal-markets model can be seen as follows. 
Assume that there are two identical countries. Within each country, two (or more) goods are 
consumed. The domestic and foreign firms compete in both markets. The reciprocal-markets 
model is of great help to analyse each country’s market in isolation. A crucial assumption of 
the reciprocal-markets model which makes this possible is that markets are assumed to be 
segmented, in the sense that oligopolistic firms make separate strategic choices concerning 
domestic and foreign markets. This assumption indicates that there are no arbitrary 
opportunities so that prices in the two countries are considered as independent variables. 
Another common assumption to study one market in isolation is to assume that firms produce 
under constant marginal costs. This ensures that prices or output decisions in one market do 
not affect the costs at which other markets can be served. Market segmentation and the 
assumption of constant marginal costs indicate that changes in the exogenous variables in one 
market have no implication on the other market. 
Brander (1981) considers a single oligopolistic industry and there is only one firm in 
each country that competes in this industry. The model is symmetric, where both home and 
foreign firms have the same marginal cost of production and face the same trade costs. Brander 
and Krugman (1983) extend the analysis to allow general demand functions. Both of them 
demonstrate that intra-industry trade can happen in equilibrium even when products are 
identical. In addition, there is a U-shaped relationship between welfare and trade costs. 
Following by Leahy and Neary (2013)，the results in a more general setup that allows for 
product differentiation will be presented as follows. 
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1.3.1 Quantity competition 
By considering multilateral free trade between two identical countries under quantity 
competition with differentiated products in the presence of transport costs, Leahy and Neary 
(2013) show that oligopolistic competition is an independent determinant of trade. This 
conclusion can also be applied to the case of two-way trade in Brander (1981) when the 
products are identical. When products become more differentiated, the volume of trade 
increases further due to the love of variety property. Another output effect of trade liberalisation 
is reflected by the dumping margin (i.e., the gap between the prices received by each firm in 
the domestic and foreign market). Each firm is selling more in its home market than abroad as 
the marginal cost is higher in its foreign market with the trade cost. As a consequence, the 
equilibrium price of each firm yields a lower mark-up cost on its foreign sales than on its home 
sales. The result is called “reciprocal dumping” by Brander and Krugman (1983). It is shown 
by Leahy and Neary (2013) that the dumping is positively related to the level of trade costs and 
the substitutability between goods. 
Second, consider the effects of trade costs on the profits. By looking at the home firm, 
its total profits are calculated as the sum of its profits from the domestic and foreign markets. 
Leahy and Neary (2013) illustrate that profits are decreasing in trade costs in the 
neighbourhood of zero trade costs, while it is increasing in trade costs in the neighbourhood of 
autarky. Therefore, with linear demand, profits as a function of the transportation cost are U-
shaped in the region where trade occurs. To begin with, from zero trade costs, an increase in 
the trade costs has a negative effect on the export due to the higher costs in the foreign market. 
Meanwhile, the home sales are enhanced by an equal increase in its rival’s costs. It is shown 
that the former effect dominates and total profits and sales decrease for a tiny rise in trade costs 
when the initial trade cost is zero. From autarky, there is no export initially, a small decrease 
in trade costs have no effect on profits in the export market. However, a fall in the trade costs 
of the foreign firm will reduce the sales and the profits of the home sales, as they were initially 
at the monopoly level. Therefore, overall profits are falling in trade cost at autarky. 
Lastly, the effect of trade costs on welfare will next be examined. Focusing on the home 
firm, the welfare equals to the sum of home consumer surplus and the profits of domestic firms 
in both domestic and foreign markets. It is shown that trade costs are positively related to the 
prices, as trade liberalisation leads to an increase in competition, in turn, reduces the price. 
Therefore, consumer surplus increases monotonically as trade costs decrease. Starting from 
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zero trade costs, both profits and consumer surplus are harmed by an increase in the firm’s own 
costs. Hence, the overall welfare initially falls for a small increase in trade cost. Second, starting 
from autarky, if there is a reduction in trade costs, consumer surplus will increase since the 
price decreases as a result of more intensive competition. Meanwhile, profits reduce due to the 
negative effects on the prices and sales. Therefore, price effects cancel, leaving the negative 
effect of sales on the overall welfare. In conclusion, welfare as a function of the transport cost 
is also U-shaped, reaching its maximum at zero trade cost but its minimum below the 
prohibitive level of trade costs. Brander and Krugman (1983) provide an alternative 
explanation, where they believe that trade imposes waste because of the transport costs while 
at the same time decreasing monopoly distortion. First, if the transport costs are very small, 
cross-hauling is costless and the procompetitive effect outweighs the increased waste of 
resources. Second, if the transport costs are reduced marginally from prohibitive levels, the 
procompetitive effect is dominated by the increased waste of resources. 
1.3.2 Price competition 
Most of the literature on the welfare effects of international trade under imperfect 
competition has focused on the Cournot duopoly model. Clarke and Collie (2003) are the 
pioneers to investigate the welfare effects of international trade in the Bertrand duopoly model 
with product differentiation. Assuming a two-country model with linear demands and constant 
marginal costs, they illustrate that welfare under both unilateral and multilateral free trade is 
always greater than welfare in autarky for any trade cost. 
The effects of trade cost on profits and welfare under price competition are very similar 
to quantity competition for trade costs between zero and the threshold level at which no trade 
occurs: they are U-shaped in trade costs. However, because the procompetitive effect under 
Bertrand duopoly is stronger than under Cournot duopoly, there may be a potential threat of 
exports even when trade costs exceed the threshold level which affects home firm’s behaviour. 
Leahy and Neary (2013) derive that the home firm’s outputs at the prohibitive level of trade 
costs under Bertrand competition are higher than the unconstrained monopoly output level. It 
follows that the home firm has no incentive to increase its price, as the foreign firm would 
make positive sales and lower the home firm’s profits. The potential competition from the 
foreign firm will exist until the trade costs reach the prohibitive level under Cournot 
competition, then the home firm can behave as an unconstrained monopolist. That is to say, a 
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change in the trade cost still has an impact on the profits and welfare where trade does not 
actually occur under Bertrand competition because of the stronger procompetitive effect.  
The intuition of the U-shape relationship between trade costs and welfare can be seen 
as follows. Starting from autarky, trade liberalisation increases welfare. This is the region 
where the home firm is faced with the potential threat of exports even though no actual trade 
occurs between two countries, so that there are no wasteful transport costs. According to the 
home firm’s profit-maximising strategy, a reduction in trade costs from autarky lead to a lower 
price. As a result, welfare will be higher. As trade costs fall further to be lower than the 
prohibitive level in the case of Bertrand competition, imports become profitable and actual 
trade occurs, leading to a U-shaped relationship between welfare and trade costs as in Cournot 
competition. Remarkably, Clarke and Collie (2003) have found that there are always gains 
from trade whatever the level of trade costs, i.e., the minimum level of welfare under trade is 
higher than the autarky welfare.  
This study will analyse the effects of trade costs on social welfare in general equilibrium. 
Following Neary (2002b, 2003a, 2003b), it is assumed that oligopolistic firms are large in their 
own sectors but small in the whole economy. Therefore, oligopolistic firms have market power 
in deciding their output, while they have ignorable effects on aggregate variables. Unlike partial 
equilibrium, the wage is endogenously determined by the full employment condition in the 
general equilibrium, and it provides the solution of the aggregate profits and social welfare. 
when the trade cost is relatively high, a fall in trade cost will increase the equilibrium wage 
because of a redistribution of labour. The production costs will increase for firms across all 
sectors as the cost function is assumed to be the Ricardian cost structure in GOLE approach. 
The equilibrium prices will also increase in response to the increased cost. On the other hand, 
a reduction in trade costs leads to a fall in the prices due to the competition effect. It is shown 
that the cost effect dominates when the trade cost is relatively high while the competition effect 
dominates when the trade cost is low enough. Therefore, the equilibrium prices as a function 
of trade costs follows a hump-shaped pattern when the products are identical. In terms of social 
welfare, it is U-shaped in the trade cost, reaching its minimum level below the prohibitive trade 
level. In addition, social welfare when the trade cost is zero is higher than the autarky welfare. 
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1.4 Outline of this study 
The organisation of this study is as follows. 
Chapter 2 compares welfare under two forms of taxation (per-unit versus ad valorem) 
in general equilibrium. Following Grazzini (2006), it is assumed that oligopolists are 
simultaneously producers and consumers. In an exchange economy, the government 
implements a commodity tax, either an ad valorem tax or a per-unit tax, on the goods produced 
by the oligopolists. This chapter shows the limitations in Grazzini (2006), who claims that per-
unit taxation is welfare superior to ad valorem taxation when the number of oligopolists is 
sufficiently low. I will argue that the result of Grazzini’s model entirely depends on the form 
of social welfare function. In addition, there may be no efficiency gain during the shift from 
one taxation regime to the other in Grazzini’s model and instead, redistribution of income plays 
a critical role in increasing welfare when the number of oligopolists is sufficiently low. Two 
different approaches will be presented. Section 2.2 provides a social welfare function that 
differs from Grazzini (2006), and it is shown that the superiority of which taxation over the 
other depends on the form of social welfare function. Section 2.3 introduces the lump-sum 
transfers from the group of gainers to the group of losers to the model of Grazzini (2006). The 
result shows that welfare with ad valorem tax is ambiguously greater than that with per-unit 
tax in the present of the lump-sum transfers.  
Chapter 3 compares welfare under two forms of tariff (per-unit versus ad valorem) in 
partial equilibrium given a constraint of FDI cost under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. 
It is assumed that a home firm competes with its foreign rival in the domestic market and both 
firms have the same marginal cost of production. The home government implements an import 
tariff, either an ad valorem tariff or a per-unit tariff, on the foreign firm. The foreign firm needs 
to pay the import tariff if it chooses to export, and incurs a sunk cost if it undertakes FDI. An 
increase in import tariffs will reduce the profitability of exporting relative to the profitability 
of undertaking FDI. Thus, a rise in import tariffs would cause foreign firms to switch from 
exporting to undertaking FDI. It is assumed that the home government maximises the tariff 
revenue and the revenue is increasing in import tariff up to the critical level where the foreign 
firm is just willing to supply the home country by exporting. The results suggest that ad 
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valorem tariff is welfare superior to per-unit tariff under both Cournot and Bertrand 
competition.  
Chapter 4 analyses the welfare effects of trade cost in general oligopolistic equilibrium 
(GOLE). It is assumed that there are two perfectly symmetric countries and a continuum of 
industries. In each industry, there is one home firm that competes with its foreign rival in a 
Cournot fashion. The linear demand function is linear and the cost function is the Ricardian 
cost structure. In section 4.2, it allows for product differentiation in the so-called “featureless” 
economy, i.e., all sectors have identical costs in two identical countries. It is shown that social 
welfare under zero trade cost is always greater than that under prohibitive trade cost if the 
products are differentiated. In section 4.3, products are assumed to be homogeneous, but there 
exists comparative advantage for both countries. Social welfare is U-shaped in trade costs 
under both cases in section 4.2 and section 4.3. 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion. It summaries the main findings and limitations of this study.  
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Chapter 2 : Ad Valorem Versus Per-unit (Specific) Taxation 
in an Oligopoly Model 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to study the welfare properties of different forms of taxation in imperfectly 
competitive economies, the public finance literature has paid attention to the 
comparison between per-unit (specific) and ad valorem taxes. It is widely known that, 
in the context of perfect competition, ad valorem taxation and per-unit taxation are 
equivalent. This is because firms do not have control over prices, and they will treat the 
ad valorem tax as a fixed amount which equals to a unit tax of that amount. If the taxes 
are set so that the consumer prices are the same, the tax revenue will be the same with 
both taxes. Therefore, the balance between these two taxations is a matter of no 
significance. To see this issue in more details, the figure 2-1 is drawn.  
 
Figure 2–1: Ad valorem and per-unit taxes in competitive markets 
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0 1D D  is the before-tax demand curve. The ad valorem tax can be treated as a 
rotating down the demand curve, and there is no tax at a zero price (where the demand 
curve intersects the x-axis). Therefore, the effect of ad valorem tax is to rotate the 
demand curve. The price that the firm receives is a fixed percentage of the price paid 
by the consumer. 1 1D D  is ad valorem demand curve and 1E  is the after-tax equilibrium. 
In the case of per-unit taxation, the price that the firm received will be less than the 
original price as the firm has to pay the per-unit tax on each unit to the government. 
The per-unit-tax demand curve 2 2D D  is also drawn in figure 2-1 which has the identical 
magnitude at the equilibrium 1E . The demand curve 2 2D D  is moved down by the same 
amount at that level of output. As a result, if the taxes are set so that the consumer price 
is the same with both taxes, the equilibrium output and tax revenues will be the same. 
In summary, a per-unit tax and an ad valorem tax which raise the same revenue have 
the identical impact on equilibrium output. 
Due to the growing interest in the comparison of per-unit taxation and ad valorem 
taxation in the context of imperfect competition, a fairly large body of literature has 
been published3. Suits and Musgrave (1953) argued that the government receives lower 
revenue with per-unit taxes than under a method of ad valorem taxes, given that the 
consumer price and the quantity of the monopoly good stayed unchanged. This can be 
seen from figure 2-2 with a case of linear demand. 
                                                             
3 Keen (1998) offers a comprehensive review of the welfare comparison under two types of taxation.  
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Figure 2–2: Ad valorem and per-unit taxes in monopoly 
OS, FD and FA stand for the original marginal cost, demand and marginal revenue 
schedules before the introduction of tax in Figure 2-2, respectively. Suppose that the 
government introduced a per-unit tax equals to HK on the monopoly, EB and EL are 
the new demand curve and marginal revenue curve faced by the supplier once the tax 
is taken into account. As a result, the equilibrium price becomes OG and the equilibrium 
output decreases to OX. Therefore, tax revenue is represented by the region a. In order 
to compare the effect of two types of taxation on tax yield, assume that the level of final 
output and price are the same with both taxes. Hence, the new marginal revenue curve, 
RA, must pass through point T. Combined with the new demand curve, the tax revenue 
under ad valorem tax is obtained as the combination of the region a and b in Figure 2-
2. As can be clearly seen, tax revenue is higher with an ad valorem tax than with a per-
unit tax. The reason is that the per-unit tax decreases marginal revenue by exactly the 
same amount as the tax, while the ad valorem tax lowers marginal revenues by less than 
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the amount of the tax4 . As a monopolist produces the quantity at which marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost, output decreases by less if marginal cost is decreased by 
less. Therefore, for any given level of equilibrium output, the ad valorem tax leads to 
more tax revenue. Skeath and Trandel (1994b) further strengthened this claim. They 
point out that ad valorem taxation Pareto dominates (i.e., higher consumer surplus, 
profit and tax revenue) per-unit taxation. To be more specific, by considering a shift 
from per-unit tax to ad valorem tax, a monopoly tends to have an increasing incentive 
to expand its output. This is because the expansion of output reduces the tax wedge5 in 
the case of ad valorem tax, while has no impact on the tax wedge in the case of per-unit 
tax. The expansion of output directly demonstrates that consumer surplus is higher with 
ad valorem tax. In addition, as a profit-maximising monopoly continues producing with 
ad valorem tax, the profit exceeds what it would have earned with per-unit tax. 
Moreover, Skeath and Trandel (1994b) show that an increase in tax revenue follows 
with an increase in the total revenue( PQ ). The switch from per-unit tax to ad valorem 
tax causes the total revenue to increase, so that raises the tax revenue. It is worth noting 
that as a profit-maximising monopoly always sets the price on the elastic part of the 
demand curve. Therefore, an expansion of output gives rise to an increase in total 
revenue. Blackorby and Murty (2007) study a general equilibrium model with a 
monopoly sector. They show that the set of per-unit-tax Pareto optima is identical to the 
set of ad valorem-tax Pareto optima when profits are taxed at 100% and tax revenues 
are returned to consumers. This result contradicts with the literature mentioned above 
relating the comparison of per-unit and ad valorem taxation. They argue that the 
                                                             
4 If the monopoly pays a per-unit tax  , then marginal revenue is reduced by  . By contrast, an ad 
valorem tax at rate t  reduces marginal revenue by  tMR q . Assuming that the equilibrium production is 
the same, we have    q tqp q tp q    . As price is greater than marginal revenue,  tMR q  . 
5 Tax wedge is the deviation between what consumers pay and what producers receive from a transaction 
due to the taxation of a good. In an ad valorem regime, the tax wedge is 
t tP p tp  , while in a per-unit 
tax regime, the tax wedge is P p   .   
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previous literature ignores the fact that the monopoly profits must be returned to 
consumers in a way such as government taxation and a lump-sum transfer.  
The systematic comparison of ad valorem and per-unit taxation under oligopoly 
starts with Delipalla and Keen (1992). Delipalla and Keen (1992) study a model of 
homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly with and without free entry. They show that 
per-unit taxes are more likely to be over-shifted than ad valorem taxes. By considering 
a tax reform (denoted as P-shift) that raises the ad valorem tax and decreases the per-
unit tax whilst leaving the tax revenues at the initial equilibrium price unchanged, they 
confirm the welfare dominance of ad valorem taxation both in the short run with a fixed 
number of firms and the long run with free entry and exit of firms. In addition to the 
Pareto comparison of ad valorem and per-unit taxes in a monopoly setting, Skeath and 
Trandel (1994b) also show that the Pareto dominance of ad valorem taxation applies to 
symmetric Cournot-Nash oligopoly setting when the tax rate exceeds a critical level. 
Intuitively, higher values of initial tax cause a reduction in the equilibrium output, and 
thus an increase in the elasticity of demand at the equilibrium. Therefore, Pareto 
dominance tends to hold if the per-unit tax is sufficiently high. The welfare dominance 
of ad valorem taxation over per-unit taxation is established by Denicolò and Matteuzzi 
(2000) for the case of asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Asymmetries in costs lead to an 
additional consideration that tends to favour ad valorem taxation: switching from per-
unit to ad valorem taxes advantages the more efficient firms. Anderson et al. (2001a, 
2001b) extend the welfare comparison of the two taxes under imperfect competition to 
settings with Bertrand competition and differentiated products. According to Anderson 
et al. (2001a), under Cournot competition with homogeneous and differentiated 
products, ad valorem taxation dominates per-unit taxation as more tax revenue is 
obtained under an ad valorem tax if the consumer prices are the same with both taxes, 
both in the short and long run. However, per-unit taxation can be more efficient under 
Bertrand competition with product differentiation. Anderson et al. (2001a) put forward 
a question whether this inverse ranking is due to the mode of competition or the 
existence of product differentiation in the short run and they provide weak evidence in 
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favour of the former one (i.e., the Bertrand competition)6. When there is free entry, the 
superior ability of ad valorem tax to extract firm profits tends to reduce their incentives 
to enter the market. This will decrease the number of product varieties as well as welfare. 
By contrast, a higher degree of over-shifting implies that firm profits are higher with a 
per-unit tax and this will advantage the number of varieties and welfare. Anderson et al. 
(2001a, 2001b) focus on tax incidence and the conditions under which taxes are 
overshifted/undershifted. They demonstrate that the high level of demand convexity 
that is necessary to cause the over-shifting of taxes is ruled out by the standard oligopoly 
assumptions. The degree of the over-shifting of excise taxes depends on the ratio of 
curvature of the firm’s demand to the elasticity of the market demand. As Anderson et 
al. (2001b) state, the particular regime of excise tax can have distinct impacts for tax 
incidence, over-shifting of taxes can happen, and firm profits can increase under either 
taxes. Using quadratic preferences, Wang and Zhao (2009) model a single-differentiated 
product oligopoly model in the presence of substantial firm heterogeneity. Their result 
shows that, with sufficiently differentiated goods and a high enough cost variance, per-
unit taxation can be superior to ad valorem taxation under either Cournot or Bertrand 
competition7. Hamilton (2009) extends the analysis to multi-product transactions where 
firms are selling a wide variety of product. According to Hamilton (2009), over-shifting 
is more likely to happen in settings with multi-product firms than in the single-product 
case. The intuitive explanation is that if there is an increase in the excise tax, the multi-
product firms will reduce product variety, leading to less competition among firms for 
the remaining products. In addition, Hamilton (2009) shows that when the marginal 
production cost is fixed, ad valorem taxation is superior to per-unit taxation in the 
                                                             
6 Anderson, De Palma and Kreider (2001a) show that the product differentiation tends to play no role in 
this issue. Either tax regime may be preferred depending on revenue requirement even with a small 
amount of production differentiation.   
7 According to Cheung (1998), failures to extend the ordinary ranking to some oligopoly studies can be 
explained. In the original framework where the dominance consequence is acquired, a homogeneous 
product is assumed to be sold by a single firm. As a result, the price distortions are simply exaggerated 
by these two types of taxation. However, in the extended framework, due to the more complex setting, 
the additional distortions may happen. The original price distortion may have opposite effects under per-
unit and ad valorem tax which destroys the initial dominance. 
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“normal” case, that is consumer preferences are increasing in variety. However, if the 
consumers have decreasing preferences for variety, the opposite result will occur. Lapan 
and Hennessy (2011) consider a two-good multi-product oligopoly where marginal 
costs can differ across firms and products, and preferences of a representative consumer 
are convex. They demonstrate that ad valorem taxation dominates per-unit taxation only 
in a qualified way when ad valorem tax rates are identical across products. When ad 
valorem taxes differ across products, ad valorem taxes cannot successfully replace per-
unit taxes. Besides, Lapan and Hennessy (2011) show that the welfare ranking of the 
two taxes depends on unit cost covariance across multi-product firms and 
complementarity in demand. Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) extend the comparison 
of the two forms of taxation to allow the possibility of collusion in imperfectly 
competitive markets using the P-shift employed by Delipalla and Keen (1992). By 
considering an infinitely-repeated game with discounting where collusion is supported 
by either a permanent reversion to the Nash equilibrium strategy or an optimal 
punishment strategy, they show that a switch from per-unit to ad valorem taxation 
makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement. Therefore, they claim that the 
conventional wisdom (i.e., ad valorem taxation is preferred on welfare grounds) may 
not hold when collusion is sustainable with an ad valorem but not with a per-unit tax. 
Azacis and Collie (2014) argue that the use of P-shift in Colombo and Labrecciosa 
(2013) is flawed because the necessary tax reforms will not be valid when prices differ 
in the different phases of the game. Instead of using P-shifts, Azacis and Collie (2014) 
compare the effects of ad valorem and per-unit taxes that yield the same consumer price 
in all phases of the game and they demonstrate that ad valorem taxation will always 
yield higher revenue than per-unit taxation if partial collusion is considered. Vetter 
(2014) studies the effect of taxes on pass-through rates8 and competition in a model of 
homogeneous-good duopoly. It is shown that the taxes have different competitive 
effects due to the equilibrium is a consistent-conjectures equilibrium which is affected 
                                                             
8 The pass-through rate is defined as the rate at which prices to consumers rise when a tax is imposed on 
producers. 
20 
 
by the taxes. According to Vetter (2014), when taxes co-determine market conduct, ad 
valorem taxation may have a stronger anti-competitive effect than per-unit taxes. 
Therefore, per-unit taxation becomes more attractive when market conduct is 
endogenous. Häckner and Herzing (2016) systematically examine the welfare effects 
of taxation in oligopolistic markets. They focus on how pass-through rates and the 
marginal costs of public funds of ad valorem and per-unit taxes respond to the changes 
in variables such as the number of varieties, the degree of product differentiation, the 
substitutability of goods and the mode of competition. They find that pass-through rate 
is negatively related to the marginal costs of public funds and this relationship is of 
great help from a policy point of view in situations where the marginal cost of public 
fund is difficult to obtain. According to this, Häckner and Herzing (2016) find that the 
marginal cost of public fund is lower for ad valorem taxes as ad valorem taxes have a 
pro-competitive element. Therefore, it is always preferred to increase revenue by 
adjusting the ad valorem taxes. Recently, Vetter (2017) argues that the dominance of 
ad valorem taxation in Häckner and Herzing (2016) holds only if market conduct is 
unaffected by the mix of the taxes. i.e., the mode of competition is exogenous. If market 
conduct switches from the Bertrand type to the Cournot type, the conclusion will be 
reversed. In particular, Vetter (2017) compares per-unit and ad valorem taxes in a two-
stage differentiated-product duopoly: firms pre-commit to capacity in the first stage and 
compete in prices in the second stage. The Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model with 
soft capacity constraints enables to relate taxes to market conduct through the 
relationship between the long-term decisions of firms and the taxes. According to Vetter 
(2017), a change of taxes away from an ad valorem and towards a per-unit tax enhances 
the competitive pressure, which suggests that the per-unit tax is superior to the ad 
valorem tax. In addition, it is shown that a combination of two taxes or a pure per-unit 
tax is preferred to a pure ad valorem tax as shifting from pure ad valorem taxation to 
pure per-unit taxation may change market conduct and bring lower consumer price and 
higher tax revenue. 
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In a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the 
economy and firms maximise the utility of shareholders, Collie (2015) analyses the 
incidence of different types of taxes (i.e., lump-sum transfers, profits taxes, per-unit 
taxes and ad valorem taxes) and compares the revenue with per-unit and ad valorem tax 
that yields the same price (therefore, the same aggregate output). Collie (2015) shows 
that an ad valorem tax generates higher tax revenue than a per-unit tax with both 
homothetic and quasi-linear preferences. Besides, Collie (2015) also demonstrates that 
when profits are taxed at 100%, as in Blackorby and Murty (2007), there is no 
difference in total tax revenue between the two taxes.  
Grazzini (2006) considers the case of a Cournot oligopoly that involves two groups 
of players as well as two goods. The first group of players (consumers) are supposed to 
behave competitively on the exchange market. Furthermore, at the beginning, they are 
equally endowed with only good 1. By contrast, the second type of players (oligopolists) 
are not initially endowed with any good. Instead, each oligopolist owns a firm which 
can produce good 2 by using good 1 as input. Unlike consumers, they behave 
strategically on the exchange market. Grazzini (2006) separately analyses the 
preferences of these two groups with two regimes of taxation. She concludes that 
consumers would be more willing to accept ad valorem taxation while oligopolists 
prefer per-unit taxation. By focusing on the social welfare point of view, she shows that 
per-unit taxation is superior to ad valorem taxation if the number of oligopolists is 
sufficiently low compared to the number of consumers.  
Grazzini (2006) assumes that all agents have identical utility functions given by 
the product of the consumption of two goods ( 1 2u x x  ). This utility function is 
homogeneous of degree two. As a utilitarian social welfare function (
1
n
i
i
W u

  ) is 
applied in Grazzini’s model, it can be shown that if goods are transferred from a poorer 
player to a richer player then social welfare will increase. To see this, simply consider 
an economy with two agents and the social welfare is calculated as 
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W u u u x x x x

      . Further suppose that agent A has strictly more 
allocation of both goods than agent B, i.e., 1 1
A Bx x  and 2 2
A Bx x .If a redistribution of 
allocation occurs between them that transfers a quantity x  of good two from agent B 
to agent A, the new social welfare can be obtained as 
   1 2 1 2A A B BA BW u u x x x x x x         . The new social welfare is greater than the 
original one before the redistribution of allocation:  1 1 0A BW W x x x       . This 
conclusion also extends to an economy with n agents. Hence, it is ambiguous whether 
an improvement of social welfare is the result of an efficiency gain or not as the 
redistribution of income may also increase the social welfare. Therefore, the conclusion 
of Grazzini’s article seems not to be persuasive.  
Though the comparison of welfare between per-unit and ad valorem taxation has 
been one of the earliest issues in the study of public finance, the analysis under general 
equilibrium remains limited. By using a strategic market game9, Grazzini (2006) argues 
that per-unit taxation welfare dominates ad valorem taxation if the number of 
oligopolists is sufficiently low in general equilibrium. However, this result tends to be 
driven by the effect on income distribution rather than the effect of general equilibrium. 
The aim of this chapter is to compare social welfare under two forms of taxation (per-
unit versus ad valorem taxation) in an exchange economy and to argue that ad valorem 
taxation is welfare superior to per-unit taxation under general equilibrium. The results 
show that the conventional wisdom can also be extended to the case under general 
equilibrium. Two different approaches will be applied. Section 2.2 provides the first 
method by changing the utility function from 1 2x x   to 
1/2 1/2
1 2x x   and comparing the 
magnitude of welfare with per-unit and ad valorem taxation. Grazzini (2006) measures 
the welfare by a utilitarian social welfare function. As mentioned above, the social 
                                                             
9  The strategic market game (SMG) is defined as the general equilibrium mechanism of strategic 
allocation of resources. It is of great help to study the interaction among players in a game and the 
influence of their decisions on essential elements (e.g., prices, income distribution). 
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welfare put more weight on the wealthy consumers if the utility function is 
homogeneous of degree two. The updated utility function which is homogeneous of 
degree one would avoid this issue. Section 2.3 offers the second approach by 
introducing the lump-sum transfers from the group of gainers to the group of losers. 
The introduction of the lump-sum transfers can be of help to distinguish whether the 
welfare domination of one type of taxation is due to the efficiency gain or the 
redistribution of income. The same result will be derived in sections 2.2 and 2.3: ad 
valorem tax is welfare superior to per-unit tax.  
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2.2 A new social welfare function  
Consider an exchange economy with two goods (i.e., good 1 and good 2) and two 
types of agents (i.e., consumers and oligopolists). Suppose the number of consumers is 
n and they behave competitively in the market. Each consumer is equally endowed with 
good 1. The number of oligopolists is assumed to be m and each oligopolist is 
characterised by no initial endowment of good 1. Instead, he can produce good 2. More 
importantly, good 1 is needed as input in the process of producing good 2. In addition, 
he keeps some good 2 for private consumption and sends the rest to the exchange 
market for trade. Assume that all players have the following utility function:  
 1/2 1/21 2 1 2( , )U x x x x    (2.2.1) 
This utility function is a monotonic transformation of the one used in Grazzini’s 
model ( 1 2x x ) so that the two functions represent the same preferences of consumers. 
However, the measurement of social welfare will be different. The application of a new 
utility function is aimed at examining whether the conclusion of Grazzini (2006) could 
be applied to a game with a different measurement of social welfare. 
The initial endowments for consumers are defined by 
 
1
,0 , 1,...,cie i n
n
 
  
 
  (2.2.2) 
And for oligopolists 
  0,0 , 1,...,o je j m    (2.2.3) 
The consumers equally share one unit endowment of good 1 while the oligopolists 
do not own any good.  
25 
 
In addition, the oligopolists can produce good 2. An amount jz  of good 1 is 
employed by oligopolist j in order to produce an amount jy  of good 2. To capture the 
relationship between the amount of input and output, we consider the following 
technology function    
 
1
, 0j jy z 

    (2.2.4) 
where   is a positive constant. It follows that one unit of good 2 can be produced 
out of   units of good 1. As an exchange market exists, the oligopolists can exchange 
good 2 for good 1 from consumers, after deciding how much of good 2 they are going 
to produce and consume. The production level is determined by the amount of good 1 
they buy from consumers. Suppose that they send jq  out of the amount jy  produced 
of the second good to the exchange market for trade. Naturally, they will keep the rest 
amount j jy q for their private consumption. It is clear that the amount jq  of good 2 
determines the equilibrium exchange rate between two goods. Assume that each 
oligopolist can individually choose the share jq and the total supply of good 2 is then 
described as 
1k
k
m
q

 . For the agents of type 2, they behave strategically on the exchange 
market with strategies defined by pairs  ,j jq y .  
The government implements a commodity tax on good 2. In this section, we 
consider two forms of tax: an ad valorem tax and a per-unit tax. Denote 2p  as the 
consumer price. Under the regime of ad valorem tax, the producer price of second good 
becomes  2 2 1P p t   with a tax rate  1 0t t  . Clearly, the total ad valorem tax 
can be calculated as 2
1
m
t m
k
R tp q

  . Regarding the per-unit tax, the producer price of good 
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2 is defined as 2 2P p    with a per-unit tax   0 τ 1/   . Accordingly, the total 
per-unit tax is formulated as 
1
m
m
k
R q 

  . 
Let  1 2, p p   be a price vector with  0 1,2  hp h   , a competitive agent i  , 
1, ,i n  , solves the following problem  
1 2 1
1/2 1/
2
2
, 1 2max    .
1
   .x x x p xx x s t
n
   
where 2 1/p p p . Let   be the Lagrange multiplier and consider the following 
Lagrangian function 
  1/2 1/21 2 1 2 21
1
,L x x x x x
n
px
 
   
 
  
The first-order necessary conditions for the problem are 
 
1 1
2 2
1 2
1
1
0
2
L
x x
x


  

  (2.2.5) 
 
1 1
2 2
1 2
2
1
0
2
L
x x p
x


  

  (2.2.6) 
 1 2
1
 0x p x
n
L


 

    (2.2.7) 
Solve the system above; it gives rise to the equilibrium allocation: 
 
1 1
( ) , ,     1,...
2 2
p i n
n np
 
  
 
ix   (2.2.8) 
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The total demand for good 2 is 
1 1
2 2
TD n
np p
   . 
The indirect utility function v of the representative consumer can be obtained by 
substituting the equilibrium allocation (2.2.8) into the utility function (2.2.1): 
 
1 1
( )
2 2
p
n np
  
   
  
v   (2.2.9) 
Regarding the group of oligopolists that we have discussed above, they 
strategically choose  ,j jq y , 1, ,j m  . The profit of oligopolist j in the case of ad 
valorem taxation can be defined as 
  ( , ) 1tj j j j jq y p t q z      (2.2.10) 
In contrast, the payoff under a per-unit taxation can be calculated as 
  ( , )j j j j jq y p q z
      (2.2.11) 
Suppose that each oligopolist will spend the entire profit to purchase good 1. As a 
result, he can purchase (1 ) j jp t q y   and ( ) j jp q y    amount of good 1 under 
the regime of ad valorem tax and per-unit tax, respectively. 
The utility payoffs in the case of an ad valorem tax is given as 
    1 j j j jp t q y y q     (2.2.12) 
The utility payoffs with a per-unit tax for a representative oligopolist are: 
    j j j jp q y y q      (2.2.13) 
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       In addition, market clearing condition implies that total demand equals total supply 
of good 2: 
1
1
2
m
k
k
q
p
   (2.2.14) 
Rearranging the formula above yields the equilibrium exchange rate 
 
1
1
2
m
k
k
p
q



  (2.2.15) 
The utility functions of oligopolists with both taxes can be obtained as 
  
1
1
( , ) ; 1,...,
2
j j j j j jm
k
k
t
W q y q y y q j m
q
 

  
  
      
  
  
  

  (2.2.16) 
By setting  0t  , the payoffs of the game in the case of per-unit ad valorem taxation 
can be expressed as follows, 
  
1
1
( , ) ( - ) - - ; 1,...,
2
j j j j j jm
k
k
W q y q y y q j m
q
  

 
 
  
 
 
 

  (2.2.17) 
Similarly, by setting 0   , the payoffs of the game in the case of ad valorem 
taxation can be expressed as follow 
  
1
1
( , ) ; 1,...,
2
t
j j j j j jm
k
k
t
W q y q y y q j m
q


 
 
    
 
 
 

  (2.2.18) 
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Each oligopolist maximises the utility level by choosing his own strategy  ,j jq y . 
Let Q  be the total supply of good 2 (i.e., 
1
m
k
k
Q q

 ). The optimality condition with 
respect to jq  gives 
    
  
1
2
1
1 1
1
1
0
2
j j j j j
i
j j j j
y q q q y
QW
q q y y q
  


   
                
   
 
             11 1 0j j j j jy q q q y
Q
  
  
          
             
(2.2.19) 
where 1
1
2
t
Q

    
It is clear that  
 
 
1
1
1
1
=
j
j j j j
q
Q
y q q y

 
 
    
 
   
 
The optimality condition with respect to jy  yields 
     
  
1
2
1
1
1
0
2
j j j j
i
j j j j
q y y qW
y q y y q
  


     
 
   
 
                       1 0j j j jq y y q        
                              
(2.2.20) 
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It follows that 
 1
1
=
j j j jy q q y

    
 
The first-order conditions can be rewritten as  
 
 
   
1
1
1 1
1
j
j j j j j j
q
Q
y q q y q y


   
 
    
  
      
 (2.2.21) 
From the second equality of the equation (2.2.21), 
   11 jq
Q
 
 
    
 
  (2.2.22) 
Rearranging the expression above gives 
 1 2 ,     1,...,
1
jq
Q j m
Q t
 
  

  (2.2.23) 
Summing up equation (2.2.23) yields the equilibrium supply of good 2 to 
consumers 
 
   
 
* 1 1 ,     ,
2
h
m t
Q h t
m

 
 
 

  (2.2.24) 
Where the subscript h, ,h t  , represents a variable in the case of ad valorem or 
per-unit taxation. It follows that the total supply of good 2 is negatively related to 
whichever tax regime introduced by the government (i.e., * / 0hQ t   , 
* / 0hQ    ). 
Intuitively, in order to enhance the utility, oligopolists will trade less with consumers if 
the government raises the tax rate and increase their consumption on good 2. 
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From (2.2.15) and (2.2.24), the equilibrium price can be derived as  
 
 
   
* ,    ,
1 1
h
m
p h t
m t
 


 
 
  (2.2.25) 
It implies that a rise in either an ad valorem tax or a per-unit tax would increase the 
equilibrium price. As the producer price is defined as  1 ;    ,h hP p t h t     , the 
effect of taxes on prices is given by： 
1
1 0
1
P p
d d m
 
 
 
   

 
in the case of per-unit taxation, and 
 1 1t t
t t
P p
t
p dt p dt
 
   =0 
in the case of ad valorem taxation. 
Since * / 1hp    , per-unit taxes are over-shifted. It indicates that consumer price 
increases by more than the amount of the tax. In contrast, the ad valorem taxes are fully 
shifted10 , that is, the proportional change in the consumer price is the same as the 
proportional change in the tax. 
The total tax revenue in the case of ad valorem taxation equals to  
 
* * * 1
2
t t tR tp Q t    (2.2.26) 
 
                                                             
10 Grazzini (2006) claims that ad valorem taxes may be under shifted, but the result does not seem to be 
correct. 
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Similarly, total tax revenue in the case of per-unit taxation can be calculated as  
 
 
 
* * 1
2
m
R Q
m
 


 

 

  (2.2.27) 
In addition, using (2.2.23) and (2.2.24), we obtain 
 
   
 
*
2
1 1
,    1,..., ;     ,
2
jh
m t
q j m h t
m

 
 
  

  (2.2.28) 
and 
 
   
 
*
2
2 1
,    1,..., ;    ,
4
jh
m t
y j m h t
m
  

  
  
  

  (2.2.29) 
Following Grazzini (2006), we analyse a transformation from an ad valorem tax t 
to a per-unit tax 𝜏 which leads to the same tax revenue (i.e., a revenue-neutral change). 
The tax revenue with per-unit tax and ad valorem tax are given in equations (2.2.26) 
and (2.2.27). Equating these two formulas yields  
 
 
 
11
2 2
m
t
m

 



  (2.2.30) 
It is easy to find the value of  which is employed as a basis of comparison as: 
 
 1 1
m t
m t

 
 
  (2.2.31) 
It implies that the tax revenue in the case of per-unit tax with an amount of 
 1 1
m t
m t

 
 is the same as the tax revenue in the case of ad valorem tax with a rate of 
t.  
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By substituting (2.2.31) into (2.2.25), the price at equilibrium in the case of per-
unit taxation obtains as 
 
 
*
1 1
m
p
m t



 
  (2.2.32) 
By substituting (2.2.28) and (2.2.29) into (2.2.18), the utility level for each 
oligopolist under ad valorem tax obtains as 
  * * 1
2 2
1
,
4
t jt jt
t
W q y
m 

   (2.2.33) 
Similarly, by substituting (2.2.28) and (2.2.29) into (2.2.17) and using (2.2.31), the 
utility level for each oligopolist under per-unit tax obtains as 
  * * 1
2 2
1
,
4
j jW q y
m
  

   (2.2.34) 
In order to understand how much each oligopolist would gain (lose) from the 
change in the taxes, calculate the gap in the utility level under two taxation regimes 
 
1
2 2
0
4
t
t
W W W
m



       (2.2.35) 
It can be clearly seen from the above equation that oligopolists are always better 
off with the regime of per-unit taxation based on the comparison of revenue-neutral tax 
changes. 
With respect to consumers, by substituting (2.2.25) into (2.2.9), the utility level for 
each consumer in the case of ad valorem tax obtains as 
  
   *
1 1
2 2
1 1
2
t
m t
V p
nm 
 
   (2.2.36) 
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Similarly, the utility level for each consumer in the case of per-unit tax is obtained 
by substituting (2.2.32) into (2.2.9): 
  
 *
1 1
2 2
1 1
2
m t
V p
nm


 
   (2.2.37) 
The change of utility level with these two types of taxation obtains as:  
    
   * *
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
0
2
t
m t t m t
V V p V p
nm


     
         (2.2.38) 
Thus, unlike oligopolists, consumers are willing to accept the regime of ad valorem 
taxation in the context of the revenue-neutral tax change.  
Proposition 1: Ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to per-unit taxation 
regardless the number of consumers and oligopolists in general equilibrium.  
Proof.  
Define social welfare as the arithmetic sum of each agent’s utility level. 
S nV mW   
From (2.2.35) and (2.2.38), the difference in the social welfare with ad valorem 
and per-unit taxes obtains as 
 
    
    
1 1 1
2 2 2
1
2
1 1 1 1
2 4
2 m 1 1 1 1
                              =
4
m t m t t
S n V m W
m m
m t t m t t
m
 

    
      
      
             
(2.2.39) 
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Suppose that the social welfare is positive, and then the following inequality must 
hold 
    2 m 1 1 1 1 0m t t m t t         
Rearranging the inequality gives 
   1 1 1 1
2 m
t
m t t m t        
Squaring the both sides and the gap obtains as 
    
2
2
1 1 1 1 0
2 m
t
m t t m t
 
        
 
  
  
  2 2 8 2 1 16
0
4
t t m m t m
m
  
   (2.2.40) 
Let k denote the following equality 
 2 8 2 1 16k t m m t m      
 2 8 2 1
k
t m m
t

  

  
Since m represents the number of oligopolists, and t is positive. Therefore, k  is 
monotonously increasing in t (i.e., / 0k t   ). It can be shown that 
0
16 0
t
k k m

    
It confirms that 0S  , i.e., welfare with ad valorem taxation is always greater 
than that with per-unit taxation.  
Q.E.D. 
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Grazzini (2006) argued that a revenue-neutral transformation from an ad valorem 
tax to a per-unit tax enhances social welfare if the number of consumers is sufficiently 
high with respect to that of oligopolists. However, the conclusion seems to contradict a 
large amount of literature with models under partial equilibrium. Grazzini (2006) then 
attributes this contradiction to the use of general equilibrium.  
However, according to the result of this paper, ad valorem dominates per-unit 
taxation in the view of social welfare and the result is regardless of the number of 
consumers and oligopolists. Notice that Grazzini (2006) considers the following utility 
function： 1 2u x x ，and as an arithmetic social welfare function is used, social welfare 
put more weight on the rich consumers. In contrast, the utility function which is 
homogeneous of degree one has been applied in this paper, i.e., 1/2 1/21 2u x x . It is a 
monotonic transformation of the utility function used by Grazzini and represents the 
same consumer preferences. The only difference is the social welfare function. As a 
consequence, the results in the context of general equilibrium are in consonance with 
the standard results under partial equilibrium.
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2.3 An introduction of lump-sum transfers 
This section introduces another comparison between per-unit and ad valorem 
taxation by allowing lump-sum transfers in the model. To be more specific, the utility 
function will be the same as the one used by Grazzini (2006), i.e., 1 2u x x . Including 
the lump-sum transfers into the game permits the redistribution of income. In the 
context of this, we focus on the comparison of welfare between ad valorem and per-
unit taxation and verify if both consumers and oligopolists can be made better off under 
ad valorem taxation with the lump-sum transfers.    
As can be seen from equation (2.2.35) and (2.2.38), a revenue-neutral shift from 
one type of taxation to the other leads to a different level of utility for both consumers 
and oligopolists. Thus, a lump-sum transfer plays a key role in shrinking the gap 
between gainers and losers. To be more specific, gainers would have to pay an amount 
of tax in order to get them back to the same level of utility that they had before taxation 
changed. In contrast, losers would be willing to be offered an amount of subsidy that 
would make them as good as before the change in taxation. Regarding the government, 
it receives the tax from the gainers and compensates to the losers.   
Suppose that both consumers and oligopolists have identical utility function U 
defined as in Grazzini (2006) 
  1 2 1 2,U x x x x   (2.3.1) 
Where 1x  and 2x  are quantity consumed of good 1 and good 2. Initial endowments 
of consumers are defined by 
 
1
,0 ,    1,...,ie i n
n
 
  
 
  (2.3.2) 
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Each consumer is equally endowed with 
1
n
 unit of good 1.  
Each oligopolist, by contrast, is not endowed with anything at the beginning:  
  0,0 ,    1,...,je j m    (2.3.3) 
In order to survive, agents of type 2 are assumed to have a linear technology:  
 
1
,    0j jy z 

    (2.3.4) 
Each oligopolist produces good 2 using the technology above and they will decide 
how much of good 2 to keep as a private consumption and will send the rest jq  to 
exchange market for the consumption of good 1.  
Now suppose that the government imposes a lump-sum transfer which affects 
agents’ behaviour. As a result, the lump-sum transfer enters consumers’ budget 
constraint. More precisely, a competitive agent i  , 1, ,i n   , solves the following 
problem  
1 2, 21 2 1
max   . .  
1
 x x nx x s t x p x T
n
    
where 2 1/p p p and nT  denotes a lump-sum transfer. If nT  is negative, then each 
consumer pays nT  to the government as he receives higher utility level with the new 
form of taxation. However, if he is worse off with the change of taxation, he will obtain 
a lump-sum transfer nT  from the government. nT  is positive in the latter example. The 
government’s tax revenue (expenditure) from all consumers could be easily formulated 
as nnT . 
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The Lagrangian function obtains as 
   1 2 1 2 1 2
1
,  nx x x x T xL p x
n

 
     
 
 
First-order conditions yield: 
 2
1
0
L
x
x


  

  (2.3.5) 
 1
2
0
L
x p
x


  

  (2.3.6) 
 1 2
1
 0nx p x T
n
L

 



   (2.3.7) 
Solve the system above; it gives rise to individual demand as: 
  
1 1
, ,       1,...
2 2
n nnT nT i n
n np
  
  
 
ix p   (2.3.8) 
The total demand for good 2 is 
1
2
nnT
p

. 
To calculate the indirect utility function v of a competitive consumer, substitute the 
individual demand (2.3.8) into the utility function (2.3.1), 
  
1 1
2 2
n nnT nTv p
n np
   
   
  
  (2.3.9) 
Regarding the oligopolists, each of them will receive a lump-sum transfer mT  from 
the government if he is worse off with the fresh type of taxation. Alternatively, he will 
have to pay a lump-sum transfer mT  to the government if he is better off. Consequently, 
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a lump-sum transfer accordingly has an impact on the profits of oligopolists. The profit 
of oligopolist j in the case of ad valorem taxation obtains as 
    , 1tj j j j j mq y p t q z T       (2.3.10) 
And in the case of per-unit taxation as 
    ,j j j j j mq y p q z T       (2.3.11) 
where Tm denotes the lump-sum transfers to oligopolists. Thus, 𝑚𝑇𝑚 captures the 
total government tax revenue (expenditure). 
Furthermore, the utility payoffs in the case of an ad valorem tax are: 
    1 j j m j jp t q y T y q      (2.3.12) 
The utility payoffs in the case of a per-unit tax are: 
    j j m j jp q y T y q       (2.3.13) 
Given these strategies  ,j jq y   1, ,j m   , the value of p which satisfies the 
market clearing condition is given by 
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Rearranging the formula above yields 
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  (2.3.15) 
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By substituting the equilibrium price in the utility payoffs (2.3.12) and (2.3.13), the 
payoffs of the oligopolists can be expressed as 
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   (2.3.16) 
The payoffs of the oligopolists in the case of per-unit can be expressed as 
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  (2.3.17) 
Similarly, the payoffs of the oligopolists in the case of ad valorem taxation can be 
expressed as 
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   (2.3.18) 
The optimality condition with respect to 𝑞𝑗 gives 
                22 2 0j j m j j j
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               (2.3.19) 
where Q represents the total supply of good 2 and 
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The optimality condition with respect to jy  yields 
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It follows that      2 0j j m j j
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The first order conditions could be rewritten as  
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  (2.3.21) 
The second equality of the above equation shows that 
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Rearranging the expression above gives 
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  (2.3.23) 
Summing up equation (2.3.23) yields the equilibrium supply of good 2 
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  (2.3.24) 
It shows that oligopolists are more (less) willing to exchange goods with consumers 
if there is an increase in lump-sum subsidy (tax) to consumers. 
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From (2.3.15) and (2.3.24), equilibrium price level can be then derived as  
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It is worth noting that a lump-sum transfer plays no role in the equilibrium price.  
Total tax revenue in the case of ad valorem taxation equals to  
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Similarly, total tax revenue in the case of per-unit taxation equals to  
 
   
 
* * 1 1
2
nnT mR Q
m
 


 
 
 

  (2.3.27) 
Furthermore, using (2.3.23) and (2.3.24), we obtain 
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and 
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  (2.3.29) 
It can be seen from the equilibrium output that both lump-sum transfers from 
consumers and oligopolists will affect oligopolists’ decision on the output level. 
In order to examine if all players (i.e., consumers, oligopolists and the government), 
with the introduction of lump-sum transfers, can be better off under ad valorem tax, we 
then study a transformation from a per-unit tax   to an ad valorem tax t which raises 
the same direct tax revenue.  
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Equating (2.3.26) and (2.3.27)  
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  (2.3.30) 
yield the basis of comparison 
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It implies that by setting the per-unit tax   equal to 
 1 1
m t
m t

 
, the government 
will receive an identical amount of indirect tax revenue as that of ad valorem taxation 
regime.  
By substituting (2.3.31) into (2.3.25), the price at equilibrium in the case of per-
unit taxation obtains as 
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By plugging (2.3.32) into (2.3.9), the utility level for each consumer in the case of 
per-unit tax obtains as 
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The utility without lump-sum transfers could be derived by setting 0nT  , it gives 
rise to   
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By plugging (2.3.25) into (2.3.9), the utility level for each consumer in the case of 
ad valorem tax obtains as 
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Suppose that the economy is absent from the lump-sum transfers, consumer’s 
payoff could be expressed as  
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Comparing (2.3.34) and (2.3.36), it is clear that consumers receive unambiguously 
higher payoff under the regime of ad valorem taxation 
2
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Since consumers would obtain more payoffs if the government implement an ad 
valorem tax, this suggests government to collect the lump-sum taxes from consumers 
under ad valorem taxation. 
In order to calculate the degree of lump-sum transfers that would make them 
indifferent between per-unit taxation and ad valorem taxation, we equate (2.3.34) and 
(2.3.35)  
 tv v    (2.3.37) 
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Solving (2.3.38) gives rise to 
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Where 
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 and
 n
T  represents the amount of lump-sum transfers 
that consumers are indifferent between ad valorem and per-unit tax in terms of utility.  
By substituting (2.3.28) and (2.3.29) into (2.3.16), the utility level for each 
oligopolist under per-unit tax obtains as                           
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In the absence of lump-sum transfers, each oligopolist obtains payoff which 
is equal to  
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Similarly, by substituting (2.3.28) and (2.3.29) into (2.3.17), the utility level for 
each oligopolist under ad valorem tax obtains as 
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  (2.3.42) 
By setting both Tm and Tn equal to zero, each oligopolist receives the following 
payoff without lump-sum transfers 
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  (2.3.43) 
Since 0tW W   , oligopolists acquire greater utility under the regime of per-unit 
taxation. They will be losers if government alters the taxation regime to ad valorem 
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taxation. This suggests the government to offer a lump-sum subsidy to oligopolists, in 
order to compensate their loss. 
In order to calculate the level of lump-sum transfers that would make indifferent 
between two taxations, we equate (2.3.41) and (2.3.42) 
 tW W    (2.3.44) 
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Solving (2.3.44) gives rise to  
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Substituting (2.3.39) into (2.3.45) implies 
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By receiving a compensation equals to mT  , oligopolists are indifferent to the 
change of taxation regime.   
During the shift from per-unit to ad valorem taxation, the government obtains a 
lump-sum transfer nT  from each consumer and pay a lump-sum transfer mT  to each 
oligopolist. As a result, all agents are indifferent between these two taxations. 
Meanwhile, the total government revenue from lump-sum can be calculated as 
  L n mGR nT mT     (2.3.47) 
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As can be seen from equation (2.3.27), taxes revenue from per-unit is obtained as 
*R . Total tax revenues from ad valorem in the present of lump-sum transfers obtain as 
* L
tR GR . 
As has been discussed, the tax revenue from per-unit taxation is the same as that 
from ad valorem taxation. It follows that the difference of the tax revenue between per-
unit and ad valorem taxation is the total lump-sum transfers that the government 
received. 
Proposition 2: Both consumers and oligopolists can be made better off under ad 
valorem taxation than per-unit taxation with lump-sum transfers. 
Proof.  
Substituting (2.3.39) and (2.3.46) into (2.3.47):    
 
  3
3
1 1
1
2
L
n m
t
GR nT mT
m
  
        
The total government revenue from lump-sum transfers can be simplified as  
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Therefore, the following inequality must hold: 
  31 2 2 1 0t m m       
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Rearranging the inequality above yields: 
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Squaring both sides of the inequality 
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The inequality above can be expressed as  
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Therefore, the following inequality must hold 
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The inequality above can be simplified as 
  2 24 3 1 2 1 0t mt m m t m       
Denote  2 24 3 1 2 1g mt m m t m       
The first order condition implies that   2/ 2 3 1 1g t mt m m m       . Since m 
is the number of oligopolists, g is monotonously increasing in t (i.e., / 0g t   ) and 
0
2 1 0
t
g g m

    . 
It turns out that 0
LGR  , i.e., the government will receive positive revenue from 
the lump-sum transfers. 
Q.E.D. 
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In conclusion, the government gains from the policy of lump-sum transfers. The 
money received from consumers outweighs government’s expenditure. Thus, all 
players in this game can be made better off by altering the taxation policy. 
According to Grazzini (2006), per-unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad 
valorem taxation in the context of general equilibrium. However, as can be seen from 
above, welfare under ad valorem taxation is always greater than that under per-unit 
taxation if a lump-sum transfer is introduced. The result of Grazzini’s model is due to 
the effect of taxation on the distribution of income rather than from any efficiency gain. 
In order to analyse why Grazzini derives a result that per-unit taxation is preferable 
in the view of social welfare, I calculate the marginal utility of transfer in the absence 
of taxes (i.e., 0t   and 0  ). From equation 2.3.33 (or equation 2.3.35), the marginal 
utility of transfer for each consumer obtains as: 
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  (2.3.48) 
Similarly, from equation 2.3.40 (or equation 2.3.42), the marginal utility of transfer 
for each oligopolist obtains as: 
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The relation between the number of consumers and oligopolists when per-unit 
taxation welfare dominates ad valorem taxation in Grazzini’s paper is 
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  (2.3.50) 
It can be shown that when the number of consumers exceeds the critical number 
above, the marginal utility transfer for each oligopolist is always greater than that of 
each consumer. The proof can be seen as follows. 
51 
 
By substituting 
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into equation (2.3.48) and considering zero tax ( 0t   ), 
yields: 
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Calculate the difference in the marginal utility of transfer for each oligopoly and 
consumer when the number of consumers is set to be the critical value in Grazzini’s 
model: 
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By setting 1   and 5n  , the following diagram shows the marginal utility of 
transfer for each oligopolist and consumer: 
 
Figure 2–3: Marginal utility of income for consumers and oligopolists 
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The vertical line in figure 2-3 is the critical value for m in (2.3.50). It can be clearly 
seen that when the number of oligopolists is sufficiently low with respect to that of 
consumers, each oligopolist has a higher degree of marginal utility of transfer. As has 
been clarified above, oligopolists receive unambiguously higher payoff under the 
regime of per-unit taxation. During the shift from ad valorem taxation to per-unit 
taxation, transferring one unit of the consumption good from consumers to oligopolists 
will cause an increase in the social welfare. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Grazzini (2006) compares welfare under two types of taxation, i.e., per-unit and ad 
valorem taxation, in the case of general equilibrium. She shows that per-unit taxation 
may be superior to ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare. However, there are several 
limitations in Grazzini’s model. First, as social welfare is measured by a utilitarian 
social welfare function and the utility function is formed as homogeneous of degree 
two ( 1 2x x ). It implies that the social welfare put more weigh on rich consumers and the 
distribution of income may enter the determination of social welfare. One can argue 
that Grazzini’s result may not be convincing because a different result would be derived 
with a new utility function. Section 2.2 shows that the model that involves a utility 
function that is homogeneous of degree one ( 1/2 1/21 2x x ) will result in an opposite result, 
i.e., welfare under per-unit taxation is less than under ad valorem tax. This dominance 
is consistent with the majority of literature. The utility function is a monotonic 
transformation of 1 2x x  and both functions represent the same preferences of consumers. 
The only difference is the measurement of social welfare. It can be summarised that the 
exceptional result from Grazzini’s paper may be determined by the measurement of 
social welfare rather than the general equilibrium framework.  
Second, the result of Gazzini’s model is due to the effect of taxation on the 
redistribution of income rather than from any efficiency gain. In order to further 
compare welfare under per-unit and ad valorem taxation, a lump-sum transfer is 
introduced from one group to the other in section 2.3. We consider a shift from a per-
unit tax to an ad valorem tax which gives the same tax revenues. Regarding the 
consumers, they receive higher utilities with ad valorem tax. As a result, they would 
pay up to an amount of nT  to enter an economy with ad valorem taxation. To be more 
specific, when they pay an amount of nT  to the government, they will be indifferent to 
these two taxation regulations and the government will receive extra revenue which 
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equals to nnT . On the other hand, oligopolists obtain lower payoffs under ad valorem 
taxation. In order to encourage oligopolists to accept the new regulation, government 
promises to offer an amount mT  of lump-sum subsidies for each oligopolist. As a 
consequence, the government has to spend a total amount of mmT and oligopolists will 
be indifferent under per-unit and ad valorem taxation. As can be seen from section 2.3, 
the government revenue from the lump-sum tax is greater than the government 
expenditure from the lump-sum subsidy. It turns out that by introducing the ad valorem 
taxation, the government will receive a positive revenue. It is clear that all players (i.e., 
consumers, oligopolists and government) are made better off under ad valorem taxation. 
Thus, welfare with ad valorem tax is ambiguously greater than that with per-unit tax.  
Besides, the result of Grazzini’s paper tends to be a consequence of the difference 
between the marginal utility of transfer for each oligopolist and consumer. Due to the 
fact that each oligopolist has a higher level of marginal utility of transfer when the 
number of oligopolists is relatively low compared to that of consumers, social welfare 
is higher in the case of per-unit tax since oligopolists obtain more payoffs with per-unit 
tax. 
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Chapter 3 : Ad Valorem Versus Per-unit (Specific) Tariff 
with FDI Constraint under Cournot and Bertrand Duopoly 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The theoretical models have argued that strategic considerations affect the decision 
between exports and FDI, starting with Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Smith 
(1987), where FDI is treated as a strategic investment in models of intra-industry trade 
under Cournot duopoly. Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Rowthorn (1992) 
examine the decision between exporting and FDI in symmetric two-country models 
with endogenous market structure. It is assumed that there are fixed costs at the firm 
level, plant-specific fixed cost and increasing returns in production. They suggest that 
the decision of the entry depends on the trade-off between market size and trade costs 
(what is called proximity-concentration trade-off). FDI strategy is favoured when plant-
specific fixed costs are sufficiently low compared to trade costs. By allowing for 
potential entry by domestic producers, Motta (1992) shows that the tariff may have 
opposite effects on the decision of the multinational firm. Specifically, the tariff may 
lead the multinational to decide not to invest as the local firm may enter the market with 
the introduction of the tariff. The tariff-jumping investment could improve the welfare 
of the host-country only when the local firm would not have participated in the 
competition under free trade. Motta and Norman (1996), Norman and Motta (1993) and 
Neary (2002a) analyse the effects of the trade liberalisation on the FDI pattern in two-
country and three-country models, and argue that a reduction in trade cost may 
encourage FDI. Norman and Motta (1993) assume asymmetric production costs and 
focus the analysis only on the FDI strategy of the outsider firm. In the following 
contribution in 1996, they consider the influence of market accessibility on both 
outsider and insider FDI with identical production costs. Neary (2002a) also studies the 
FDI strategy of the outsider firm and assumes that the potential multinational has a first-
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move advantage. Unlike most literature on export and FDI under oligopoly that 
employs static game theory models, Leahy and Pavelin (2003) use an infinitely-
repeated game to present the follow-my-leader FDI put forward by Knickerbocker 
(1973). They show that there is a positive interdependence between FDI decisions of 
firms. In other words, foreign investment by one firm gives rise to the increased 
incentive for others to follow suit. Neary (2009) explains why trade liberalisation results 
in a massive increase in FDI in the real world. It happens for the following two reasons. 
To begin with, intra-bloc trade liberalisation has a positive effect on horizontal FDI in 
trading blocs, since foreign firms establish plants in one country as export platforms to 
serve the bloc as a whole. In addition, trade liberalisation encourages cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and this form of FDI (M&As) is quantitatively more 
important than greenfield FDI. Mukherjee and Suetrong (2008) consider the case of 
home-country export platform FDI, and show that both the positive and negative 
relationships between FDI and trade cost can happen. Besides, they present the 
implications of market size and competition between the asymmetric home and host-
country firms. Collie (2009) uses an infinitely-repeated game with both Cournot 
duopoly and Bertrand duopoly models with differentiated goods. As in a static game, 
undertaking FDI by one firm will intensify competition and therefore, reduce its 
competitor’s profits in its home market. The outcome is often a prisons’ dilemma where 
all firms are made worse off if they all undertake FDI than if they all export. Collie 
(2009) shows that the prisons’ dilemma can be avoided by implicitly colluding by 
choosing to export rather than undertake FDI. Then trade liberalisation may lead firms 
to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI when trade costs are sufficiently high. 
Recently, Collie (2011) explains the increases in both the amount of FDI and the 
volume of world trade by using a ‘regional tariff jumping’ model. In a setting with two 
regions and two countries in each of them, Collie (2011) shows that multilateral trade 
liberalisation may induce firms to shift from exporting to undertaking FDI when the 
inter-regional transport cost is sufficiently large.  
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Chapter 2 has outlined the existing literature regards the welfare comparison of 
per-unit and ad valorem taxation in public finance. The welfare comparison also applies 
to the study of international trade. Ad valorem and per-unit tariffs were firstly compared 
by Hillman and Templeman (1985). In an import monopoly market, they point out that, 
when the home country is supplied with imports by a foreign monopoly, any positive 
per-unit tariff could be replaced by an ad valorem tariff which gives a higher level of 
welfare. The intuition is that, since the tariff extracts revenue from the foreign 
monopolist, ad valorem tariff is necessarily superior to a per-unit tariff as the tariff 
revenue is higher with the ad valorem tariff. The Pareto comparison of ad valorem and 
per-unit tariff has been addressed by Kowalczyk and Skeath (1994). They have shown 
that, in a setting where a home country imports from a foreign monopolist, ad valorem 
tariffs are welfare superior to specific tariffs. However, there exists no general Pareto 
ranking of the two tariffs. When import demand is linear, it is shown that monopoly 
profits are higher with the optimal per-unit tariff than with the optimal ad valorem tariff. 
Skeath and Trandel (1994a) demonstrate that any per-unit tariff can be replaced by a 
Pareto-dominating ad valorem tariff if the home country is supplied by a foreign 
monopolist. In other words, the domestic consumer surplus, tariff revenue received by 
the home government and foreign profit are all larger with an ad valorem tariff. The 
result is driven by the fact that the foreign monopolist has an incentive to increase 
output when shifting from a per-unit to an ad valorem tariff due to the increased 
elasticity of import demand with an ad valorem tariff. In general equilibrium, Jørgensen 
and Schröder (2005) study welfare effect of two tariff regimes in a symmetric two-
country environment with homogeneous firms competing monopolistically and 
consumers who have the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function. By considering that all tariff revenues will be redistributed to consumers, 
Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) demonstrate that per-unit tariff may welfare dominate 
ad valorem tariffs. The intuition has to do with the free entry and exit of firms. To be 
more specific, it is found that more domestic firms operate under a per-unit tariff regime, 
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resulting in a larger number of varieties than under an ad valorem tariff. Therefore, 
consumer surplus under per-unit tariff is higher due to higher variety generated.  
The comparison of ad valorem and per-unit tariffs under oligopoly starts with 
Helpman and Krugman (1989). They consider a foreign country that consists of n 
identical firms who sell a quantity q of homogeneous product to an importing country 
and compete in a Cournot fashion. They find that an ad valorem tariff is preferred to a 
per-unit tariff. This is because the optimal per-unit tariff occurs when marginal revenue 
declines faster than price (i.e.,    ' 'p q MR q  ) and the optimal ad valorem tariff 
occurs when the elasticity of the marginal revenue exceeds the elasticity of the demand 
(i.e., 
   MR q p q  ). It implies that whenever it is optimal to impose a per-unit tariff, it 
is also optimal to impose an ad valorem tariff because price exceeds marginal revenue. 
However, it does not apply to the converse. In addition to the Pareto comparison of ad 
valorem and per-unit tariff in a monopoly setting, Skeath and Trandel (1994a) also study 
the case when the home country faces a foreign oligopoly. They find that the Pareto 
dominance of an ad valorem over a per-unit tariff holds if tariffs are sufficiently large. 
The reason why the Pareto ranking does not generalise to all case under oligopoly is 
that, if one foreign oligopolist responds to the change from a per-unit tariff to an ad 
valorem tariff by increasing its exports to the home market, the price for imports will 
fall, which will harm the other foreign firms. As a result, the joint profits of all foreign 
oligopolists may be lower with ad valorem tariff. There is no guarantee that the market 
equilibrium must be at an elastic point on the import demand curve. Therefore, tariff 
revenues may decrease with an increase in imports. Collie (2006) analyses the welfare 
effects of per-unit and ad valorem trade policy instruments (import tariffs and 
production subsidies) in an asymmetric oligopoly market. He shows that these trade 
policy instruments have rationalisation effects (i.e., the effects relate to the equilibrium 
size of domestic and foreign firms) which depend on the curvature of demand and the 
variation of industry output. In particular, both per-unit and ad valorem tariffs move the 
industry up its demand curve thereby resulting in a flatter (steeper) demand curve if 
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demand is concave (convex). There is an additional rationalisation effect by making the 
foreign firms’ perceived demand curves flatter in the case of ad valorem tariff. By 
comparing welfare with the two tariffs that yield the same total consumption and price 
in the domestic market, Collie (2006) shows that the tariff revenue collected by the 
home government is higher with ad valorem tariff. Therefore, ad valorem tariff is 
welfare superior to a per-unit tariff. Shea and Shea (2006) examine the equivalence 
between per-unit and ad valorem tariffs in a quantity conjectural variation model. It is 
shown that if the tax revenue per unit of imports is the same for the two tariffs, an ad 
valorem tariff would generate more domestic output but less foreign output. In addition, 
they demonstrate that a per-unit tariff can be replaced by a Pareto-superior ad valorem 
tariff for all values of conjectural variation under duopoly. 
In the literature of public finance (e.g. Anderson et al. (2001a) and Azacis and 
Collie (2014)), the firms’ profits are proved to be higher with per-unit tax. The 
following analysis will confirm if the same result applies to tariffs in international trade 
for the foreign oligopolists. First, assume that there are two countries, a home and a 
foreign country and there are n firms in the home country and m firms in the foreign 
country that produce homogeneous goods and compete in the home market. Foreign 
firms can enter the home market by two alternative ways，namely, by exporting or by 
undertaking FDIs. In the first case, they bear a cost t for each unit exported if the home 
government imposes a per-unit or a proportion   of the value of the product if the 
method of ad valorem tariff is used11. In the second case, firms incur a sunk cost G of 
building a factory in the home market. All firms have the same marginal cost of 
production, c. Suppose that hiq  and 
f
jq  are the quantities of the ith firm in the home 
country and jth firm in the foreign country, respectively. The inverse demand function 
is given by  p p Q , where P  is the consumer price and 
1 1
n m
h f
i j
i j
Q q q
 
   is total 
output. It is assumed that the inverse demand function is downward sloping (i.e., 
                                                             
11 Please note that the letters used to denote two tariffs switched round from chapter two. 
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  0P Q  ) and there exists a Nash equilibrium in quantities denoted by * *1 ,...
h h
nq q  in 
the home country and * *1 ,...
f f
mq q   in the foreign country, with 
* * *
1 1
n m
h f
i j
i j
Q q q
 
    
denoting the total equilibrium output. Following Anderson et al. (2001a), the 
comparison of the effects of the two regimes of import tariff will be achieved by seeking 
a per-unit and an ad valorem tariff that yields the same price. 
The profits of the ith domestic firm are:  
   
i
h h
i p Q c q     (3.1.1) 
The first-order condition of hi  in (3.1.1) with respect to i
hq  obtains as: 
 
   
   
0
       ,    1,...
i
i
i
h
hi
h
h
p Q c p Q q
q
p Q p Q q c i n

   

   
  (3.1.2) 
The game is aggregative as in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) so that we can calculate 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium without resorting to solving N first-order conditions. 
Summing over all the first-order conditions from (3.1.2) yields: 
    * * *
1
n
h
i
i
np Q p Q q nc

    (3.1.3) 
If the home government imposes a per-unit tariff, then the profits of the jth foreign 
firm can be calculated as: 
   
j
tf f
j p Q c t q      (3.1.4) 
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The first-order condition of 
tf
j  in (3.1.4) with respect to j
fq  obtains  
 
   
   
0
       ,    1,...
j
j
j
tf
j f
f
f
p Q c t p Q q
q
p Q p Q q c t j m

    

    
  (3.1.5) 
Adding up all the first-order conditions from (3.1.5) yields: 
      * * *
1
m
f
j
j
mp Q p Q q m c t

     (3.1.6) 
Combining (3.1.3) and (3.1.6) yields:  
        * * *n m p Q p Q Q nc m c t       (3.1.7) 
If the home government imposes an ad valorem tariff, then the profits of the jth 
foreign firm can be calculated as: 
     1
j
f f
j p Q c q
      (3.1.8) 
The first-order condition of 
f
j
  in (3.1.8) with respect to 
j
fq  obtains as  
 
   
   
0
       ,    1,...
j
j
j
tf
j f
f
f
p Q c t p Q q
q
p Q p Q q c t j m

    

    
  (3.1.9) 
Adding up all the first-order conditions from (3.1.9) yields: 
    
 
* * *
1 1
m
f
j
j
mc
mp Q p Q q

 

   (3.1.10) 
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Combining (3.1.3) and (3.1.10) gives： 
      
 
* * *
1
mc
n m p Q p Q Q nc

   

  (3.1.11) 
Note that if 
1
c
t




, then the right-hand- sides of (3.1.7) and (3.1.11) are equal. 
As 
*Q  is identical under the two tariffs, it follows that the equilibrium price is also the 
same. When 
1
c
t




, the profits of each foreign firm with per-unit and ad valorem 
tariff are, respectively: 
 
      
          1 1
1
1
1
1
j j j
j j
tf f f f
j
f f f tf
j j
p Q c t q p Q c q p Q q
p Q c q p
c
Q q
c
c

   





   
          
   
 
        


 

  (3.1.12) 
It can be concluded from (3.1.12) that, when the per-unit tariff and ad valorem tariff 
both cause the same price and output, the profits of the foreign firms with the ad 
valorem tariff are lower than that with the per-unit tariff. Intuition suggests that an 
increase in import tariffs will decrease the profitability of exporting relative to the 
profitability of undertaking FDI. Hence, a rise in import tariffs would cause foreign 
firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI. As the profits of the foreign firms 
are higher with per-unit tariff, this indicates that the foreign firms can supply the home 
market longer by exporting under per-unit tariff than under ad valorem tariff, if the 
policymaker continually increases the import tariff. If the government raises the tariff 
to a level that is above the critical level, the foreign firms will always prefer to undertake 
FDI and as a result, tariff revenue collected by the government will be zero.  
There has been a lack of analysis of the comparison of per-unit and ad valorem 
tariffs given the constraint of FDI cost. The objective of this chapter is to check if the 
home government could receive higher tariff revenue with per-unit tariff than with ad 
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valorem tariff given a constraint of FDI costs and to compare the welfare with two 
tariffs when the home government maximises the tariff revenue. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that each country has only one firm and the demand function is linear. Section 
3.2 considers Cournot competition with homogeneous products and it is shown that 
government will always receive higher revenue with ad valorem tariff. Section 3.3 
provides a Bertrand competition that allows for product differentiation, and the result 
reveals that the government may receive higher revenue with per-unit tariff when the 
FDI costs are sufficiently small. Regarding the welfare comparison, ad valorem tariff 
is superior to a per-unit tariff for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The 
conclusions are in section 3.4.
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 3.2 Cournot competition with homogeneous products 
In this section, it is assumed that a home firm competes with a foreign firm in a 
Cournot fashion, and they are producing homogeneous products as in the Brander (1981) 
and Brander and Krugman (1983) models of intra-industry trade.  
In the home country, there is a representative agent who has the following quasi-
linear utility function: 
    
2
1 2 1 2
2
b
U a q q q q z       (3.2.1) 
where 1q  and 2q  are the consumption of the goods produced by the home firm and 
the foreign firm respectively, z is the consumption of the numeraire good. The 
parameter a  is the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay for the good and b  is 
negatively related to the market size. The representative solves the utility maximisation 
problem by the first-order condition. Given the utility function (3.2.1), utility 
maximisation yields the inverse demand function: 
  1 2p a b q q     (3.2.2) 
3.2.1 The foreign firm chooses to export under per-unit tariff 
First, assume that the foreign firm chooses to supply the home market by exporting 
and the home government imposes a per-unit tariff. 
Denoting c  as the marginal cost for both firms and assume that there is an interior 
solution where both firms make positive profits in the home market, the operating 
profits of the home firm and the foreign firm are: 
    1 1 2 2     p c q p c t q        (3.2.3) 
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The fundamental assumption of Cournot competition is that firms realise that the 
quantity of output they supply to the market will affect their rival’s optimal supply and 
vice versa. Therefore, each firm behaves optimally believing that its rival behaves 
optimally. As a result, each firm will choose its output to maximise its profits while 
treating its rival’s output as given.  
Taking the derivative of Cournot oligopoly (
1 1 2 2/ 0, / 0q q        ), the 
equilibrium outputs, prices and profits can be solved as: 
 
   
1 2
2 2
1 2
2
             
3 3
2
3
2
       
9 9
t t
E E
t
E
t t
E E
a c t a c t
q q
b b
a c t
p
a c t a c t
b b
 
   
 
 

   
 
  (3.2.4) 
If the per-unit import tariff is prohibitive, i.e. 2 0
t
Eq   , when 
2
a c
t t

   , the 
exports from the foreign firm to the home market and the profits of the foreign firm will 
be zero and the home firm will be a monopolist in the home market.    
The revenue collected by the domestic government under per-unit tariff is： 
  2
2
3
t t
E
a c t
R t q t
b
 
    (3.2.5) 
The maximum-revenue tariff is the tariff rate that maximises the tariff revenue.    
The first-order condition for the maximisation of the tariff revenue obtains as: 
4
0
3
t a c t
b
R
t



 
  
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The maximum-revenue tariff can then be solved as: 
 
4
a c
t

   (3.2.6) 
The welfare is measured by the sum of consumer surplus, the profits of the home 
firm and the tariff revenue as in Collie (1991). 
Given the quasi-linear preferences (3.2.1), consumer surplus formulates as: 
  1 2t t tE E ECS U p q q z      (3.2.7) 
Using (3.2.7), the welfare of the domestic country obtains as 
    
1
2
     
2 2 2 3
6
t t t
E EW
a c
CS R
t a c t
b

   
  

  (3.2.8) 
Collie (1991) compares the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare 
tariff under oligopoly in a homogeneous product Cournot duopoly model with linear 
demand and constant marginal cost. He shows that, if domestic and foreign marginal 
costs are equal, the optimum-welfare tariff exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff due to 
the profit-shifting effects. The detailed proof can be seen in Appendix B5. 
3.2.2 The foreign firm undertakes FDI 
Now consider the case that the foreign firm chooses to supply the home market by 
undertaking FDI. 
Assuming that the outcome is an interior solution where both firms make positive 
profits in the home market, the operating profits of the home firm and the foreign firm 
are: 
    1 1 2 2   p c q p c q G        (3.2.9) 
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Where G  is the fixed cost of FDI, i.e., a sunk cost of building a factory in the home 
market. 
The equilibrium outputs, prices and profits of the two firms can be solved as: 
 
   
1 2
2 2
1 2
3
2
3
    
9 9
F F
F
F F
a c
q q
b
a c
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a c a c
G
b b
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

 
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  (3.2.10) 
If the foreign firm undertakes FDI to supply the home market, the tariff revenue 
collected by the domestic government will be zero. The welfare is then measured by 
the combination of the consumer surplus and home firm’s profit: 
 
 
1
2
3
t t
F F
a c
W S
b
C 

     (3.2.11) 
The foreign firm will undertake FDI if it is more profitable than exporting. 
Compare the profits of the foreign firm with FDI and per-unit tariff as below: 
 
   
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

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  (3.2.12) 
It follows that when the FDI cost is lower than the critical value tG , the foreign 
firm will always prefer to supply the home market by undertaking FDI. By contrast, if 
the fixed cost of FDI exceeds tG , the foreign firm will choose to export.  
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The first and second derivatives of the critical value tG  with respect to t  obtain as: 
 
 2
2
4 2
0
9
8
0
9
t
t
a c t
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
 
The critical value of FDI cost tG  is a concave quadratic curve in import tariff and 
tG  reaches its peak when the import tariff is at the prohibitive level t .  
Figure 3-1 shows the relationship between the critical value of FDI cost and the 
level of per-unit tariff with the following parameter values: 10, 1, 2a b c   . 
 
Figure 3–1: The profitability of FDI and exporting with per-unit tariff 
As can be seen from figure 3-1, the foreign firm will choose to supply the domestic 
market by exporting in the region where tG G . The critical value tG  is increasing in 
import tariff t  up to the prohibitive tariff 
2
a c
t

 and there is no export thereafter. 
The method of undertaking FDI is preferred for the foreign firm in the region where 
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tG G , i.e., when the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently low. It can be concluded from 
the diagram that an increase in import tariff will shift the foreign firm from exporting 
to undertaking FDI.  
3.2.3 The foreign firm chooses to export under ad valorem tariff 
Next, consider a case that the foreign firm chooses to supply the home market by 
exporting and the home government imposes an ad valorem tariff. 
Assuming that there exists an interior solution where both firms make positive 
profits, the operating profits of the home firm and the foreign firm in the home market 
are: 
     1 1 2 2     1p c q p c q         (3.2.13) 
The equilibrium outputs, prices and profits can be solved as: 
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  (3.2.14) 
If the ad valorem import tariff is prohibitive, i.e. 2 0Eq
  , when 
a c
a c
 

 

, the 
exports from the foreign firm to the home market and the profits of the foreign firm will 
be zero.   
The import tariff revenue under ad valorem tariff obtains as: 
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  (3.2.15) 
70 
 
The maximum-revenue tariff   is calculated by solving the first-order condition 
for the maximisation of the import tariff revenue collected by the home government: 
       
3 2 21 1
9
0
4R a c c a c c
b
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The welfare of the home country is measured by the sum of consumer surplus, the 
profits of the home firm and the tariff revenue: 
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  (3.2.16) 
The foreign firm will undertake FDI if the profits by undertaking FDI are greater 
than the profits by exporting: 
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  (3.2.17) 
If the FDI cost is lower than the critical value G , undertaking FDI is preferred for 
the foreign firm, while if the FDI cost is sufficiently high, the foreign firm will choose 
to supply the home market by exporting.  
The first and second derivatives of the critical value G  with respect to   obtain 
as: 
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The critical value of FDI cost G   under ad valorem tariff is also a concave 
quadratic function in import tariff, reaching its peak when the import tariff is prohibitive, 
that is   .  
The relationship between the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI G  and the level 
of ad valorem tariff is presented in figure 3-2, given the following parameter values 
10, 1, 2a b c   . 
 
Figure 3–2: The profitability of FDI and exporting with ad valorem tariff 
It can be seen from figure 3-2 that, as in the case of per-unit tariff, the critical value 
of the fixed cost G  is increasing in the ad valorem tariff up to the prohibitive tariff  . 
  
3.2.4 The profitability of FDI and exporting with two import tariffs 
To make these two regimes of import tariff comparable, the approach of Anderson 
et al. (2001a) will be used. The key idea is to assume the equilibrium price and total 
output are the same with the two import tariffs.  
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Equating the equilibrium price under per-unit tariff from (3.2.4) and under ad 
valorem tariff from (3.2.14): 
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This indicates that, when =
t
c t


, the equilibrium price, total consumption and 
consumer surplus are the same for the two regimes of the import tariff when the foreign 
firm chooses to supply the home market by exporting. 
By setting =
t
c t


, the critical value of FDI cost under ad valorem tariff becomes 
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Figure 3-3 shows the critical value of the fixed cost under per-unit tariff and the 
corresponding ad valorem tariff that results in the same equilibrium price, with the 
following parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   .  
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Figure 3–3: The profitability of FDI and exporting with two import tariffs 
Exporting is preferred for the foreign firm in the region EE  under both per-unit 
and ad valorem tariff, while undertaking FDI is preferred in the region FF  when the 
fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently low. In the region EF12, the foreign firm will shift from 
exporting to undertaking FDI in the case of ad valorem tariff, while will continue 
supplying the home market by exporting in the case of per-unit tariff. It suggests that 
the foreign firm can supply the home market by exporting for a longer period with per-
unit tariff than with ad valorem tariff. This is because, as has been shown before, the 
foreign firm can make more profits with per-unit tariff. One important question is, if 
the import tariff revenue collected by the home government is increasing in import tariff 
up to the critical level where the foreign firm is just willing to supply the home country 
by exporting, can the home government receive higher revenue under per-unit tariff 
than under ad valorem tariff given the constraint of FDI cost?  
                                                             
12 Notice that in region DF, price will not be the same as there is no tariff revenue with the ad valorem 
tariff.  
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3.2.5 The maximum tariff revenue with two import tariffs 
As has been shown above, the maximum-revenue tariff is 
4
a c
t

 , substitute it 
into the critical level of the fixed cost of FDI yields: 
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b
G
c
   (3.2.18) 
This implies that if the FDI cost exceeds tG , the government has no incentive to 
increase the import tariff to any level above t .  
The maximum tariff revenue is calculated by substituting the maximum-revenue 
tariff t  into (3.2.5): 
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   (3.2.19) 
In summary, for any level of FDI cost that is lower than tG , the tariff revenue is 
increasing in t and the maximum revenue will be at the critical value of import tariff 
where tG G . For any level of FDI cost that exceeds tG , the maximum import tariff 
revenue collected by the government will be constant at 
tR .  
Recall the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI in the case of per-unit tariff (3.2.12), 
the critical value of import tariff can be solved: 
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  (3.2.20) 
For any given level of FDI cost that is below tG , if the rate of the per-unit import 
tariff is higher than tˆ  , the foreign firm will choose to supply the home market by 
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undertaking FDI, and the tariff revenue collected by the home government will be zero. 
If the rate of import tariff is lower than tˆ , the foreign firm chooses to export so that the 
home government receives positive revenue. In order to obtain the maximum tariff 
revenue for a constraint of FDI cost, substitute tˆ  into the government revenue in the 
case of per-unit tariff (3.2.5): 
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   (3.2.21) 
As revenue is increasing in the trade costs up to t  and 0/tG t   , It follows that 
ˆ
/ 0tR G    up to the “unconstrained” maximum-revenue tariff13. 
The relationship between the fixed cost of FDI and maximum revenue collected by 
the home government is shown from the following figure, given the following 
parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   . 
 
Figure 3–4: Import tariff revenue with per-unit tariff 
                                                             
13 See Appendix B1 for the proof. 
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The maximum tariff revenue is increasing in the fixed cost of FDI up to tG . For 
t tG G G  , the maximum tariff revenue remains at the “unconstrained” maximum 
level 
 
2
12
a c
b

and it is independent of the FDI cost.  
The “unconstrained” maximum tariff revenue R

 in the case of ad valorem tariff 
can be obtained by substituting   into (3.2.15). The corresponding critical value of FDI 
cost G  is achieved by substituting   into (3.2.17). When the fixed cost exceedsG , 
the government has no incentive to increase the tariff rate as it has reached the 
“unconstrained” maximum level. If the fixed cost is lower than G , the maximum tariff 
revenue will be at the critical level of import tariff where G G  . As shown in 
Appendix B2, tG G  . Therefore, if the FDI cost is increasing from tG  to G , the 
home government will impose a constant rate of import tariff equal to t  in the case of 
per-unit tariff, while the import tariff is increasing in the fixed cost of FDI if the 
government imposes an ad valorem tariff. 
According to the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI in the case of ad valorem 
tariff (3.2.17), the critical value of import tariff can be solved as: 
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  (3.2.22) 
With the constraint of FDI cost, the home government will receive zero tariff 
revenue if the import tariff exceeds ˆ  since undertaking FDI is more profitable for the 
foreign firm. For any level of FDI cost that is lower than G  , the maximum tariff 
revenue given the constraint of FDI cost will be ˆ  . Substituting ˆ   into the tariff 
revenue R

, the maximum tariff revenue when the fixed cost of FDI is lower than G  
is: 
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(3.2.23) 
where       
2
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The relationship between the fixed cost of FDI and the maximum tariff revenue in 
the case of ad valorem tariff is demonstrated in the following figure with the parameter 
values 10, 1, 2a b c   : 
 
 
Figure 3–5: Import tariff revenue with ad valorem tariff 
As in the case of per-unit tariff, the maximum tariff revenue with ad valorem tariff 
is increasing in the fixed cost of FDI up to G . For any FDI cost that is between G  
and G  , the maximum tariff revenue will be at the constant at the “unconstrained” 
maximum level. 
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The following figure combines figure 3-4 and 3-5 to compare the maximum tariff 
revenue given the constraint of FDI cost with the two import tariffs.  
 
Figure 3–6: Import tariff revenue with two tariffs 
It appears to show that, for any given fixed cost of FDI, the home government can 
receive higher revenue under ad valorem tariff than that under per-unit tariff.  
Proposition 1: The maximum revenue with ad valorem tariff is always higher than 
that with per-unit tariff given the constraint of FDI cost under Cournot duopoly with 
homogeneous products. 
 Proof.  
Define R  as the gap between the maximum tariff revenue with ad valorem tariff 
R  and with per-unit tariff 
tR . 
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  The first-order derivative at zero FDI cost obtains as:   
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  (3.2.24) 
It indicates that the maximum revenue with ad valorem tariff dominates that with 
per-unit tariff in the neighbourhood of free FDI cost. 
Solving 0R   gives the only one positive real root: 
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intersection between the curves of maximum revenue 
tR   and R
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 if (0, ]tG G  . 
Combine this with the fact that the revenue with two tariffs is identical with zero FDI 
cost (i.e., 
0
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G
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   ) and the first-order derivative at the zero FDI cost is positive 
0
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G
R
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
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, it is sufficient to show that R  is always positive when the fixed cost of 
FDI is between 0 and tG .  
Q.E.D. 
Under per-unit tariff, for any level of FDI cost that is greater than tG , the home 
government will stick with the maximum-revenue tariff t and receive a constant tariff 
revenue. In the case of ad valorem tariff, as the maximum tariff revenue is increasing 
in the fixed cost of FDI up to G  which is higher than tG , the revenue gap R  will be 
even larger if FDI cost is between tG  and G . 
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The relationship between R  and fixed cost of FDI can be clearly seen from the 
following figure with the parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   : 
 
Figure 3–7: The revenue gap between two tariffs 
It can be concluded from Figure 3-7 that the maximum revenue with ad valorem 
tariff is always higher than that with per-unit tariff and the gap R  is increasing in the 
level of FDI cost, reaching its peak at G  and stabilising thereafter. 
3.2.6 The profits of the home firm with two import tariffs 
For any level of FDI that is lower than tG , the profit of the home firm depends on 
the FDI cost if the policymaker aims at maximising the tariff revenue. The 
corresponding profits of the home firm are obtained by substituting tˆ  from (3.2.20) 
into the profit function (3.2.4): 
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When the fixed cost of the FDI is greater than tG , the government will impose the 
rate of per-unit tariff that equals to the “unconstrained” maximum-revenue tariff t . As 
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the profits of the home firm are increasing in the import tariff14, the home firm receives 
the highest profits when the rate of import tariff is 
4
a c
t

 . Substituting t  from (3.2.6) 
into the profits of the home firm 1
t
E  from (3.2.4) yields: 
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Figure 3-8 shows the profits of the home firm given the constraint of the FDI cost 
with the following parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   . The profit of the home firm is 
increasing in the fixed cost of FDI up to tG . With an increased FDI cost, the home 
government can impose a higher import tariff on the foreign firm, and the home firm is 
benefiting from the rise in its rival's cost. 
 
Figure 3–8: The profits of the home firm with per-unit tariff 
                                                             
14  To see this, taking the first order derivative of the home firm’s profits from (3.2.4): 
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 . Intuitively, the profits of the home firm are helped if there is an increase in the 
import tariff as the marginal cost of its foreign rival will increase.   
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In the case of ad valorem tariff, the profits of the home firm given the constraint of 
the FDI cost is obtained by substituting ˆ  from (3.2.22) into 1E
  from (3.2.14): 
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where      2 22 9 3 9a c bG a c bG       . 
As the profits of the home firm are increasing in  15, the maximum profits of the 
home firm   are achieved when the rate of ad valorem tariff equals to  . When the 
FDI cost exceeds G , the profits of the home firm will be identical at the level of  . 
Figure 3-9 illustrates the profits of home firm given the constraint of the FDI cost with 
the following parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   . As in the case of per-unit tariff, the 
profits of the home firm given the constraint of FDI cost is increasing in G  up to G . 
 
Figure 3–9: The profits of the home firm with ad valorem tariff 
                                                             
15 See Appendix B3 for more detail. 
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Figure 3-10 compares the profits of the home firm with two tariffs. It suggests that 
the profits of the home firm with per-unit tariff always dominate the profits with ad 
valorem tariff. 
 
Figure 3–10: The profits of the home firm with two import tariffs 
Proposition 2: The profits of the home firm with per-unit tariff are always higher 
than that with ad valorem if the domestic government maximises the tariff revenue given 
the constraint of FDI cost. 
Proof.  
Define   as the gap between the profits of the home firm with ad valorem and 
per-unit tariff. 
It is easy to check that 
0
0
G


  . When the fixed cost of FDI is zero, undertaking 
FDI is always preferred to exporting whatever the way of import tariff is, thus the profits 
of the home firm will be identical. 
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The first-order derivative at zero FDI cost obtains as: 
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 is decreasing in the FDI cost in the neighbourhood of zero FDI cost. 
Solving 0   yields the only one positive real root: 
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Since 
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Notice that there is no difference between the profits of the home firm with per-unit and 
ad valorem tariff at zero FDI cost and 
0
0
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
, it is sufficient to say that   is 
always negative when the fixed cost of FDI is between 0 and tG .  
Q.E.D. 
Since tG G  , the profits of the home firm reach the peaks when the FDI cost is 
tG  in the case of per-unit tariff, while in the case of ad valorem tariff, the profits will 
continue increasing until the FDI cost rises to G  . It is necessary to compare the 
maximum profits of the home firm with the two regimes of the tariffs. As shown in 
Appendix B4 that, given the constraint of FDI cost, the maximum profits with ad 
valorem tariff    are dominated by the maximum profit t   with per-unit tariff. 
Therefore, the profits of the home firm are always higher with per-unit tariff given the 
constraint of FDI cost. 
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Figure 3–11: The gap in the profits of the home firm between two tariffs 
Figure 3-11 shows the gap between the profits of the home firm with ad valorem 
and per-unit tariff with the parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   . It can be clearly seen 
that the gap is decreasing in the FDI cost and reaching the minimum level when the 
FDI cost is tG .  
3.2.7 The welfare comparison of the two import tariffs 
As shown in Appendix B5, the optimal-welfare tariff exceeds the maximum-
revenue tariff under both methods of the import tariffs, which is in line with Collie 
(1991). Therefore, the welfare is also increasing in import tariff up to the 
“unconstrained” maximum-revenue tariff. 
In the case of per-unit tariff, the welfare when the FDI cost is lower than tG  can be 
calculated by substituting tˆ  from (3.2.22) into the welfare function (3.2.8) 
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If the FDI cost exceeds tG , the import tariff is independent of the fixed cost of FDI, 
and the level of welfare is constant at its peak. The highest welfare given the constraint 
of FDI cost when the tariff revenue is maximised is obtained by substituting the 
“unconstrained” maximum-revenue tariff t  into the welfare function (3.2.8): 
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2
37
96
t a cW
b

  
Figure 3-12 shows the welfare of the home country in the case of per-unit tariff 
with the following parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   . As shown in Figure 3-12, the 
level of welfare is increasing the fixed cost of FDI. 
 
Figure 3–12: The welfare with per-unit tariff 
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In the case of ad valorem tariff, the welfare of the home country given the constraint 
of the FDI cost is achieved by substituting ˆ  from (3.2.22) into the welfare function 
(3.2.16): 
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where      2 23 9 3 9a c bG a c bG      
If the home government aims at maximising the tariff revenue, the highest welfare 
given the constraint of FDI cost occurs when the rate of ad valorem tariff equals to  . 
For any level of FDI cost that is greater than G , the welfare of the home country will 
be constant at U  as the government has no incentive to raise the import tariff to any 
level that is higher than  . Figure 3-13 demonstrates the welfare of the home country 
with the following parameter values 10, 1, 2a b c   . 
 
Figure 3–13: The welfare with ad valorem tariff 
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Figure 3-14 compares the overall welfare with two regimes of the import tariffs. 
As can be observed from the figure, the welfare with ad valorem tariff dominates that 
with per-unit tariff. 
 
Figure 3–14: The welfare with two import tariffs 
Proposition 3: The welfare of the home country with ad valorem tariff is always 
higher than that with per-unit tariff if the domestic government maximises the tariff 
revenue given the constraint of FDI cost. 
Proof. 
Define W  as the gap between the welfare of the home country with ad valorem 
and per-unit tariff. 
If the fixed cost of FDI is zero, the foreign firm will always choose to undertake 
FDI. Hence, imposing a per-unit tariff or an ad valorem tariff is a matter of no 
importance for the home government. As can be expected, 
0
0
G
W

  .  
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The first-order derivative at zero FDI cost obtains as: 
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This shows that the W  is increasing in the fixed cost of FDI cost at free FDI.  
Solving 0W  , the only one positive real root is 
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Because rG exceeds the critical value tG , tW  and W  are not equal if (0, ]tG G . 
Moreover, as the welfare gap is zero when the FDI cost is zero 
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first-order derivative at the zero FDI cost is positive 
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, it can be concluded 
that W  is always positive when the fixed cost of FDI is between 0 and tG . As has 
been shown above, tG G  , the welfare gap W  is even bigger when FDI cost is 
between tG  and G . 
Q.E.D. 
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Figure 3-15 shows the gap of welfare W   with the parameter values 
10, 1, 2a b c    
 
Figure 3–15: The welfare gap between two tariffs 
It can be seen from figure 3-15 that W  is always positive and increasing in the 
fixed cost of FDI up to tG  . If the fixed cost of FDI increases from tG  to G  , the 
welfare with per-unit tariff will remain unchanged, while the welfare with ad valorem 
tariff will continue growing.    
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Figure 3-16 shows the equilibrium price with the two import tariffs for different 
values of FDI cost.  
 
Figure 3–16: The equilibrium prices with two import tariffs 
It can be seen from Figure 3-16 that the equilibrium price is always lower with ad 
valorem tariff. As consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the maximum 
price a consumer is willing to pay and the actual price he pays, the consumers in the 
home country benefit from the lower price with ad valorem tariff and gain more 
consumer surplus. 
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3.3 Bertrand competition with differentiated products 
In this section, it is assumed that the home firm competes with the foreign firm in 
a Bertrand fashion, and unlike section 3.2, the products are assumed to be differentiated 
as in Clarke and Collie (2003). 
The utility function of a representative agent in the home country is given by: 
    2 21 2 1 2 1 22
2
b
U a q q q q rq q z       (3.3.1) 
1q  and 2q  are the consumption of the goods produced by the home firm and the 
foreign firm respectively, z is the consumption of the numeraire good.  0,1r  
represents the degree of product differentiation and ranges from the case of independent 
demands ( 0r  ) to that of perfect substitutes ( 1r  ). 
Given the quadratic utility function (3.3.1), utility maximisation yields the inverse 
demand functions: 
 
 
 
1 1 2
2 2 1
p a b q rq
p a b q rq
  
  
  (3.3.2) 
By inverting the inverse demand functions above, the direct demand functions are 
obtained as:   
                                                    
1 2
1 2
2 1
2 2
a p ar p r
q
b br
a p ar p r
q
b br
  


  


                                 (3.3.3) 
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3.3.1 The foreign firm chooses to export under per-unit tariff 
To begin with, suppose that the foreign firm supplies the domestic market by 
exporting under per-unit tariff regime. 
 Assuming that there exists an interior solution where both firms make positive 
profits in the home market, the operating profits of the home and foreign firms are: 
 
 
 
1 1 1
2 2 2
p c q
p c t q


 
  
  (3.3.4) 
Under Bertrand competition, it is assumed that firms choose prices simultaneously 
and independently and sell the goods that are demanded at these prices as given by the 
inverse demand functions. Taking the derivatives of Bertrand oligopoly 1 1/ 0p    
and 2 2/ 0p   , the equilibrium outputs, prices and profits can be solved as: 
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(3.3.5) 
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If the per-unit import tariff is prohibitive, i.e. 2 0
t
Eq   , which happens when 
   2
2
2
2
a c r
r
t
r
t
  

  , the foreign firm will not supply the home country as the 
profits of the foreign firm will be zero.   
The tariff revenue collected by the home government when the import tariff is 
below t  is 
  
       
       2
21 2 2
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R t q t
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
   (3.3.6) 
In order to obtain the maximum-revenue tariff, solving the first-order condition: 
0
tR
t



  
 
   
 
2
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r
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
  (3.3.7) 
When the rate of per-unit import tariff is 
   
 
2
2
2
2 2
a c r r
r
  

, the home government 
receives the maximum tariff revenue. 
The welfare is measured by the sum of consumer surplus, the profits of the home 
firm and the tariff revenue: 
          
 
2 2 2 2
2 4
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2 2 2 1 1 3 2
2 4 5
t t t
E EW
a c r r a c r r t r t
b r r
CS R
         

 


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  (3.3.8)           
Clarke and Collie (2006) compare the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-
welfare tariff under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated. It is shown that the optimal-
welfare tariff may exceed the maximum-revenue tariff. In the symmetric case where 
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the firms have the same cost, this will happen if the degree of product substitutability 
is sufficiently high. The detailed proof will be shown in Appendix B6.  
 
3.3.2 The foreign firm undertakes FDI 
Next, consider the case that the foreign firm undertakes FDI to supply the home 
market. 
Assuming there is an interior solution where both firms make positive profits, the 
operating profits of the home and foreign firms are: 
    1 1 2 2     p c q p c q G        (3.3.9) 
The equilibrium outputs, prices and profits of the two firms can be calculated as: 
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  (3.3.10) 
The tariff revenue is zero as the foreign firm does not export goods to the home 
country. 
In order to decide how to supply the home country, the foreign firm will compare 
its profits in the way of exporting and undertaking FDI. The foreign firm will only 
choose to undertake FDI if it is more profitable than export:  
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  (3.3.11) 
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Therefore, the foreign firm will only undertake FDI if the fixed cost of FDI is lower 
than the critical value tG .  
It is easy to check that the first-order derivative 
          
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2 2
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


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  is positive and the second derivative 
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 is negative. Thus, the critical value of FDI cost is a concave 
quadratic in the import tariff which can be seen from figure 3-17 with the parameter 
values 10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r     
 
Figure 3–17: The profitability of FDI and exporting with per-unit tariff 
The critical value of FDI cost is increasing in t  up to the prohibitive tariff t . The 
foreign firm will choose to undertake FDI if the import tariff is sufficiently high. A 
reduction in import tariff at the critical value may shift the foreign firm undertaking 
FDI to exporting. In addition, it tends to show that the foreign firm is more willing to 
export rather than undertake FDI if the degree of product differentiation is low and vice 
versa. 
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3.3.3 The foreign firm chooses to export under ad valorem tariff 
Now suppose that the foreign firm chooses to supply the home market by exporting 
in the case of ad valorem tariff. Assuming the outcome is an interior solution where 
both firms make positive profits in the home market, the operating profits of the home 
and foreign firms in the home market are: 
     1 1 2 2     1p c q p c q         (3.3.12) 
The equilibrium outputs, prices and profits can be solved as:  
   
  
   
  
    
  
    
  
     
    
 
2
2 4
2
2 4
2
2
2
2
2
2 2 2
2 22 2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2 1
           
4 5 1
1 2
4 5 1
2 2 2 1
     
4 1
2 1 2
4 1
2 1 2 2
4 1 1
2
E
E
E
E
E
E
q
a c r r cr
b r r
a c r r cr
b r r
c r a r r
r
a r r c r r
r
a r
p
r c r r r
b r r
a r
p
r
q






 

 









  

    
  
    
  
     
 




     
 
     

  






    
    
2
2
2
2 2
1 2
4 1 1
c r r r
b r r
 

  


 
 
(3.3.13) 
If the ad valorem import tariff is prohibitive, i.e. 2 0Eq
  , which happens when 
   
 
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cr a r r
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  
  
  , the foreign firm will not supply the home market as the 
profits will be zero.   
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The import tariff revenue collected by the home government R

 is obtained as:                                            
 
    
  
    
  2
2
2 2 2
2 4
2
1
  
2 2 2 1 2
4 4
  
1 5 1
E E
a r r c r r a r r c r r
r
R p q
r
r b r
  
   




  
  

          


      
 
  (3.3.14) 
The maximum-revenue tariff    is achieved when the first-order condition  
/R    equals to zero. 
The welfare of the home country is measured by the sum of consumer surplus, the 
profits of the home firm and the tariff revenue collected by the home government: 
 1EW CS R
      (3.3.15) 
Undertaking FDI is a preferred way to supply the home market if it is more 
profitable than exporting: 
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(3.3.16) 
 It follows that the foreign firm will only undertake FDI if the fixed cost is lower 
than the critical value G . If the FDI cost exceeds G , exporting is a preferred way for 
the foreign firm. 
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The relationship between the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI G  and the level 
of ad valorem tariff is shown in figure 3-18, given the following parameter values 
10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r    . 
 
Figure 3–18: The profitability of FDI and exporting with ad valorem tariff 
G  is increasing in import tariff and for any given level of FDI cost, the critical 
value of import tariff imposed by the home government is lower with a higher degree 
of r  (i.e., lower level of product differentiation). 
 
3.3.4 The maximum tariff revenue with two import tariffs 
Substituting the maximum-revenue tariff t  from (3.3.7) into the critical value of 
FDI cost (3.3.11) yields: 
 
   
   
2
2
3 1
4 2 1
t a c rG
b r r
 

 
  (3.3.17) 
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For any level of FDI cost that is greater than tG  , the government will always 
impose the maximum-revenue tariff t . The “unconstrained” maximum revenue is 
achieved by substituting t  into (3.3.6): 
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  (3.3.18) 
Rearranging (3.3.11), the critical value of import tariff in the case of per-unit tariff 
obtains as: 
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  (3.3.19) 
where           2 24 1 1 2 1r a c r bG r r        
The foreign firm will choose to undertake FDI if the import tariff is greater than 
the critical value tˆ  and the tariff revenue will be zero. As the tariff revenue is increasing 
in import tariff up to t , for any level of FDI cost that is lower than tG , the maximum-
revenue tariff will be at the critical value tˆ . Substituting tˆ  into the revenue function 
(3.3.6) yields: 
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  (3.3.20) 
 Figure 3-19 shows the maximum revenue collected by the home government 
given the constraint of the fixed cost of FDI with the following parameter values
10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r    : 
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Figure 3–19: The import tariff revenue with per-unit tariff 
As can be seen from figure 3-19, the maximum revenue is increasing in FDI cost 
up to tG , then it reaches the “unconstrained” maximum level when the FDI cost reaches 
tG . In addition, it turns out that the government receives higher import tariff revenue 
with less differentiated products when the FDI cost is sufficiently low. However, the 
unconstrained maximum tariff revenue is always higher with more differentiated 
products. 
In the case of ad valorem tariff, the unconstrained maximum revenue R

 is 
obtained by substituting   into the revenue function (3.3.14) and the critical value of 
FDI cost G  when the import tariff reaches the maximum-revenue tariff is obtained by 
substituting   into (3.3.16). If the FDI cost is higher than G , the government will 
always set the rate of import tariff equals to  . While if the FDI cost is lower than G , 
the maximum-revenue tariff will be at the critical value where G G .  
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Rearranging the critical value of FDI cost (3.3.16) gives: 
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 (3.3.21) 
If the import tariff is higher than ˆ , undertaking FDI is preferred and the tariff 
revenue collected by the home government will be zero. Therefore, the maximum tariff 
revenue will be at ˆ . Substituting ˆ  into the revenue function in the case of ad valorem 
tariff (3.3.14), the maximum tariff 
ˆ
R  given the constraint of FDI cost can be obtained.  
The relationship between FDI cost and maximum revenue in the case of ad valorem 
tariff is illustrated in figure 3-20 with the parameter values
10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r    : 
 
Figure 3–20: The import tariff revenue with ad valorem tariff 
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The maximum tariff revenue is increasing in the fixed cost of FDI up to G . As in 
the case of per-unit tariff, when the FDI cost is sufficiently low, the tariff revenue with 
less differentiated products is higher than with more differentiated products. Regarding 
the “unconstrained” maximum tariff revenue, the higher the degree of product 
differentiation is, the more import tariff revenue the government will collect. 
Figure 3-21 shows the relationship between R  and the fixed cost of FDI given 
the following parameter values 10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r     
 
Figure 3–21: The revenue gap between two tariffs 
 
Proposition 4: The maximum revenue with per-unit tariff is higher than that with 
ad valorem tariff if the FDI cost is sufficiently low under Bertrand duopoly with 
differentiated products. 
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Proof.  
       Define the gap between R

 and 
tR  as R . 
If the FDI cost is sufficiently low, the government revenue with per-unit tariff 
outweighs that with ad valorem tariff, and the gap is higher with the less differentiated 
product. However, the home government is in favour of ad valorem tariff when the FDI 
cost is relatively high and the products are more differentiated.  
If the fixed cost of FDI is zero, the foreign firm will always choose to undertake 
FDI regardless what the regime of import tariff is. The first-order derivative at zero FDI 
cost is calculated as: 
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  (3.3.22) 
As the degree of product differentiation r  is between 0 and 1, it is easy to check 
that 
0
0
G
R
G 



. It shows that R  is decreasing in the FDI cost in the neighbourhood 
of free FDI.  
Q.E.D. 
The introduction of product differentiation and nature of Bertrand competition 
both intensify the competition and lower the prices, the tariff revenue with ad valorem 
tariff will be very small when the FDI cost is close to zero. As tariff revenue in the case 
of ad valorem tariff is the products of prices, the quantity of exports from the foreign 
firms and the level of ad valorem tariff, the tariff revenue with per-unit tariff is more 
likely to be higher than that with ad valorem tariff when the FDI cost is close to zero. 
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3.3.5 The profits of the home firm with two import tariffs 
When the trade cost is lower than tG , the government will set the import tariff to 
the critical value tˆ , and the corresponding profits of the home firm can be calculated 
by substituting tˆ  into (3.3.5): 
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  (3.3.23) 
When the trade cost exceeds tG , the rate of import tariff will be constant at t , and 
the profits of the home firm are obtained by substituting t  into (3.3.5): 
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  (3.3.24) 
Figure 3-22 shows the profits of the home firm given the constraint of the FDI cost 
with the following parameter values 10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r    : 
 
Figure 3–22: The profits of the home firm with per-unit tariff 
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It shows that the profits of the home firm are increasing in the fixed cost of FDI, 
and is positively related to the degree of product differentiation, i.e., the more 
differentiated the goods are, the higher profits the home firm will receive. 
In the case of ad valorem tariff, the profits of the home firm given the constraint of 
the FDI cost is calculated by substituting ˆ  into 1E
  from (3.3.13). The highest profits 
1E
  are achieved when the rate of import tariff equals to  . Figure 3-23 shows the 
profits of the home firm given the constraint of the FDI cost with the following 
parameter values 10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r    : 
 
Figure 3–23: The profits of the home firm with ad valorem tariff 
Define   as the gap between the profits of the home firm with ad valorem and 
per-unit tariff. When the FDI cost is zero, undertaking FDI is always preferred for the 
foreign firm, and the profits of the home firm will be the same under two regimes of 
the import tariffs. Hence, 
0
0
G


  . 
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The first-order derivative at zero FDI cost shows: 
 
     
      0 2 2 2
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0
2 2 2G
a c r r r
r c r r a r rG



 

  

     
  (3.3.25) 
 is decreasing in the fixed cost of FDI in the neighbourhood of free FDI. 
Figure 3-24 illustrates    with the parameter values 
10, 1, 2, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b c r     . It shows that   is decreasing in FDI cost 
when the FDI is low enough and reaching its minimum when FDI cost equals to tG . 
For any level of FDI cost that is between tG  and G , the profits of the home firm with 
per-unit tariff are constant as the home government will always impose the 
“unconstrained” maximum-revenue tariff. By contrast, in the case of ad valorem tariff, 
the import tariff will continue growing until it reaches  . The profits gap will become 
constant if the FDI cost is above tG . The figure suggests that the profits of the home 
firm are higher with per-unit tariff, which is consistent with the case of Cournot duopoly.  
 
Figure 3–24: The profits gap of the home firm between two tariffs 
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3.3.6 The welfare comparison of the two import tariffs 
In the case of per-unit tariff, given the constraint of FDI cost, the welfare tˆW can 
be calculated by substituting tˆ  into the welfare function (3.3.8): 
              
   
2 2 3 2 3
4ˆ
2
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2 2 ( 3 2 4 3
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3 2 1 2
2
t
bG r r a c a c rr r r r r r
W
b r r r
          

  
    
(3.3.26) 
If the fixed cost of FDI is greater than tG , the import tariff will be constant at t , 
and the corresponding welfare tW  is obtained by substituting t   into the welfare 
function (3.3.8): 
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  (3.3.27) 
In the case of ad valorem tariff, the welfare ˆW   given the constraint of the FDI 
cost is calculated by substituting ˆ  into the welfare function (3.3.15). When the FDI 
cost is higher than tG , the welfare of the home country will be constant at W  . 
Lastly, define W  as the gap between the welfare of the home country with ad 
valorem and per-unit tariff. If the FDI cost is zero, then undertaking FDI is always 
preferred. Therefore, there is no difference between imposing a per-unit tariff and an 
ad valorem tariff so that 
0
0
G
W

  . 
The first-order derivative at zero FDI cost obtains as: 
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It implies that the welfare of the home country is higher with ad valorem tariff in 
the neighbourhood of free FDI. Figure 3-25 illustrates the welfare gap W  with the 
parameter values  0.25 / 0.5 / 0.710, 1, 2, 5ra b c    . 
   
 
Figure 3–25: The welfare gap between two import tariffs when 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75r    
Figure 3-25 shows that the welfare of the home country is higher with ad valorem 
tariff as W  is always positive. In addition, it appears to show that the welfare gap 
W  is increasing in the degree of product differentiation. Unlike the case of Cournot 
competition where W  is increasing in FDI cost up to tG  , W  under Bertrand 
competition reaches its peak at tG  and then starts decreasing thereafter until tG . This 
is because the maximum-revenue tariff may exceed the optimal-welfare tariff when the 
value of r  is sufficiently low. As noted by Clarke and Collie (2006) the maximum-
revenue tariff is higher than the optimal-welfare tariff if r  is between 0 and 0.78 under 
Bertrand duopoly with per-unit tariff16. If the value of r  is above 0.78, then the optimal-
welfare tariff exceeds the maximum-welfare tariff. The following figure shows W  
when r  equals to 0.9. 
                                                             
16 See Appendix B6 for the detailed proof. 
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Figure 3–26: The welfare gap between two import tariffs when 0.9r    
Figure 3-26 suggests that, when the products are sufficiently close substitutes, then 
the welfare gap W  between two regimes of import tariff is always increasing in the 
FDI cost. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In summary, assume that the home government maximises the tariff revenue and 
changes the method of import tariff from per-unit to ad valorem type, the tariff revenue 
and consumer surplus will increase while the profits of the home firm will fall, and the 
overall welfare of the home country is higher with ad valorem tariff. This is because, 
when changing from per-unit to ad valorem tariff, the increase in the consumer surplus 
due to a lower equilibrium price, and the extra gain of the government revenue 
overweight a fall in the profits of the home firm. In addition, as the critical value of FDI 
cost of the maximum-revenue tariff under ad valorem tariffG   exceeds that under per-
unit tariff tG , the home government is in favour of ad valorem tariff when the fixed 
cost of FDI is sufficiently high. Due to the optimal-welfare exceeds maximum-welfare 
tariff in Cournot duopoly with constant marginal cost, welfare is always increasing in 
the level of tariff. As a result, there is an additional welfare gain with ad valorem tariff 
when the fixed cost of FDI is relatively high. 
Under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, the following conclusions 
can be drawn. First, the home firm is in favour of per-unit tariff as the profits are always 
higher with per-unit tariff than with ad valorem tariff. Besides, if the FDI cost is 
sufficiently low, the home government will receive higher tariff revenue with per-unit 
tariff, while ad valorem tariff always leads to higher tariff revenue under Cournot 
competition. This is because the introduction of product differentiation and nature of 
Bertrand competition both intensify the competition and lower the equilibrium prices. 
Lastly, the overall welfare is always higher with ad valorem tariff. This result is 
consistent with the case of Cournot competition. Switching from per-unit tariff to ad 
valorem tariff, if the FDI cost is high enough, the profits of the home firm will decrease 
while the increase in consumer surplus and government revenue will exceed the loss of 
the home firm. If the FDI cost is sufficiently small, there are two negative effects: both 
profits of the home firm and tariff revenue collected by the home government will fall. 
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However, the consumer surplus will increase and the gain from consumer surplus will 
outweigh the loss from the home firm and the government. Therefore, welfare is higher 
with ad valorem tariff even when FDI cost is close to zero.
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Appendix B 
1. To show that the maximum revenue with per-unit tariff is increasing in 
FDI costs 
    
 
2
ˆ
2
3 2 9
0
4 9
t a c bG a cR
a c bGG
   

 

  when 
 
2
12
t
a
b
G G
c


 . 
Assume that    
2
2 9a c bG a c    , squaring both sides yields: 
    2 22 9a c bG a c     
Alternatively, we have 
    
  
2 2
2
2 9 0
3 12 0
a c bG a c
a c bG
    
  
  
As 
 
2
12
a c
G
b

 , therefore, 
ˆ
0
t
G
R


 is proved. 
2. To compare the critical value of FDI costs with the maximum import 
tariff in both regimes of tariffs and show that tG G  . 
 
2
12
t
a
b
G
c
   is the critical value of FDI cost it reaches the “unconstrained” 
maximum import tariff in the case of per-unit tariff. We can find out an equivalent ad 
valorem tariff that yields the same critical value of FDI by using (3.2.17): 
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Next, confirm that if the first-order derivative 
R



is increasing when     
 
  
 
2 2 2 2
2 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5
2 2 4 3 2 2 3 4
[
               ]
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It remains to show that 0y  . Divided by 5a  on both sides and define 
c
x
a
  , 
we have: 
                
 
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5
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Since 0a c  , it can be shown that ,.1 0x  . The following figure shows the 
value of 
5
y
a
 when the value of x is between 0 and 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
5
y
a
 
x 
As 
5
0
2
x
y
a 
  and 
5
1
0
x
y
a 
 , it can be concluded that 0
R
 





. 
Therefore,   is lower than the “unconstrained” maximum-revenue tariff  . Thus, 
it is sufficient to show that tG G  . 
3. To show that the profits of the home firm are increasing in the level of 
ad valorem tariff 1 0E




   
To see this, taking the first-order derivative of the home firm’s profits from (3.2.14):  
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Define    1 2f a c c       , the first-order derivative shows that 
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2
f
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
 . There are two possibilities. First, if 2a c  , then it follows that 
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 . The minimum value of  f   is  
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Therefore,   0f   . 1 0E




  is then proved. 
4. To compare the profits with the maximum import tariff in both regimes 
of tariffs and show that t   . 
First, from the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI in the case of ad valorem tariff 
(3.2.17), find out an import tariff that is equal to the maximum profits of the home firm 
in the case of per-unit tariff (3.2.26): 
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Next, it has been shown that, in the case of ad valorem tariff, the home government 
collects the maximum revenue when the rate of import tariff is   and the corresponding 
critical value of FDI cost is G . Therefore, any amount of ad valorem tariff that is 
higher than   , the first-order derivative 
R



 will be negative and thus, the critical 
value of FDI cost will be higher than G . The first-order derivate 
R



 when the import 
tariff is 
3
a c
a c




 obtains as: 
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Therefore,    and G G   . It shows that the maximum profits of the home 
firm in the case of ad valorem tariff   are lower than that in the case of per-unit tariff 
t if the policymaker maximises the tariff revenue.  
5. To show that the optimal-welfare tariff is higher than the maximum-
revenue tariff in the case of a per-unit tariff. 
From (3.2.8), the first-order condition of the welfare shows: 
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Compare wt  to the maximum-revenue tariff, we have: 
4
w a ct t

   . This has 
been proved by Collie (1991). 
In the case of ad valorem tariff, from (3.2.16), the first-order condition of the 
welfare shows: 
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Substituting w  into the first-order derivative of the tariff revenue  
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Define 2 4 5a c ay c c    . Divided by a  on both sides of y  and define 
c
x
a
 , we have: 
2 4 5x x
a
y
x    
Since 0a c   , it can be shown that 1 0x  . The following figure shows the 
value of 
y
a
 when the value of x is between 0 and 1: 
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. As the first-order derivative is negative, 
one can conclude that w  exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff  . 
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6. To show that the maximum-revenue tariff may exceed the optimal-
welfare tariff when the value of r  is sufficiently low in the case of ad valorem tariff. 
Recall the welfare function (3.3.8) under Bertrand competition, the first-order 
condition gives: 
      
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Define t  as the gap between the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimal-welfare 
tariff.  
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Solving 0t   gives the roots of r : 
1 2 31, 0.78, 1.28r r r     
Therefore, when r  is between 0 and 2r , the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than 
the optimal-welfare tariff. If r  is greater than 2r , then 0t   and the optimal-welfare 
tariff exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff. The proof has been done in Clarke and Collie 
(2006). 
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Chapter 4 : Welfare Effects of Trade cost in General 
Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) 
4.1 Introduction 
Tracing back the evolution of the standard theory of international trade, models 
based on perfect competition dominated the mainstream thinking. The imperfectly 
competitive models became the kernel of international trade theory after the so-called 
“new trade theory” revolution from 197917. Since then, two distinct directions have 
been advanced to embed imperfect competition into international theory, which are 
monopolistically competitive models and oligopolistic models. Monopolistically 
competitive models immediately became the more popular ones among the researchers, 
but the theory of oligopoly is currently an increasingly important field that has affected 
the view of international trade, especially over the last few decades18. Leahy and Neary 
(2013) provide a comprehensive review of the welfare effects of trade liberalisation 
under oligopoly.   
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) use the reciprocal-market 
structure to study the welfare effects of trade liberalisation between two identical 
countries in a homogeneous product Cournot model. The model is symmetric, where 
both home and foreign firms have the same marginal cost of production and the markets 
are assumed to be segmented. The main result is that the relationship between welfare 
and trade costs is U-shaped. When the initial trade cost is sufficiently low, the pro-
competitive effect dominates the increased waste of resources, and then trade 
liberalisation improves welfare. However, the negative effects of expending wasteful 
                                                             
17 See Krugman (1979) for an early contribution. 
18 Head and Spencer (2017) provide a comprehensive survey regards the recent reappearance of 
oligopolistic competition in international trade in both theory and empirical work. 
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resources outweigh the pro-competitive effect if the trade cost is too high. Therefore, 
trade liberalisation can lower welfare. Brander and Krugman (1983) extend the 
reciprocal-market model to allow general demand function. Brander and Krugman 
(1983) and Venables (1985) demonstrate that there will always be gains from 
multilateral trade when there is free entry and exit of firms. This is because the waste 
on the transport cost is dominated by the pro-competitive effect of having more firms 
and a larger overall market. Collie (1996) examines the welfare consequences of 
unilateral free trade under Cournot duopoly. By assuming homogeneous goods and 
linear demand functions, Collie (1996) demonstrates that entry of a foreign firm reduces 
the welfare of home country unless the cost of the foreign firm is sufficiently lower than 
that of the home firm. He also shows that a sufficient requirement for a country to have 
higher welfare from unilateral free trade is that its firm stops producing under free trade. 
Cordelia (1993) analyses the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot oligopoly with 
many firms in each country assuming linear demand functions and zero marginal costs. 
He shows that entry of foreign firms increases domestic welfare if the domestic industry 
is very concentrated, that is, the number of domestic firms is much lower than the 
number of foreign firms. Bernhofen (2001) extends the analysis to allow for exogenous 
product differentiation using the Bowley demand functions and assuming that there are 
no transportation costs. In particular, Bernhofen (2001) focuses on the effect of product 
differentiation on the volume of trade, and the effect of trade liberalisation on profits 
and consumer surplus. He shows that the amount of intra-industry trade is positively 
related to the level of product differentiation, and the gains from trade are driven by the 
pro-competitive effect and increased product variety. Marjit and Mukherjee (2015) 
assume that there is free entry of domestic firms that compete with a single foreign firm 
in the home market and the products are differentiated. It is shown that trade 
liberalisation has no impact on the prices set by domestic firms as they do not export, 
and trade liberalisation causes a fall in consumer surplus. Collie (2016) considers a 
Cournot oligopoly model that allows free entry and exit of firms and products are 
differentiated. He shows that, when the trade cost is close to the prohibitive level, there 
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may be losses from trade. The intuition is that, though there is an increase in the total 
number of varieties to consumers, the loss of domestically-produced varieties outweigh 
the gains of imported varieties, because the imported varieties are very small when the 
trade cost is close to the prohibitive level. The analysis also applies to models with 
integrated markets. Markusen (1981) first derives the welfare effects of trade costs 
under Cournot duopoly for the case of integrated markets. It is shown that multilateral 
trade will increase outputs of both firms because of a procompetitive effect and there 
are gains from trade even though no trade actually occurs. When countries differ in 
terms of market size, international trade will lead to a higher world real income, the 
small country will always gain from trade but the large country may suffer a welfare 
loss. A sufficient condition for the large country to gain from trade is that there is an 
expansion in the output of its firm due to the trade. 
The corresponding results of trade liberalisation under price competition in a 
reciprocal-market setting were first derived by Clarke and Collie (2003). They 
demonstrate that trade imposes a stronger competition effect under price competition. 
Even if there is no actual trade between two countries, the home firm behaves as a 
constrained monopolist. As a result, trade liberalisation lowers the prices and leads to 
an increase in welfare. As trade costs decrease further, it generates a U-shaped 
relationship between welfare and the trade costs. Moreover, the level of welfare is 
always greater than that under autarky, which is not in the case under Cournot 
competition. Friberg and Ganslandt (2008) analyse if the conclusion in Clarke and 
Collie (2003) can generalise to other market structures. By assuming two identical 
countries, each with n identical local firms, they find that international trade may reduce 
welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand oligopoly if the local markets are sufficiently 
competitive and goods are sufficiently close substitutes. This is because, in a more 
competitive market with relatively similar goods, the negative effect of costly trade may 
dominate the benefits of having more competition and variety of products. The U-shape 
relationship between welfare and trade costs holds in this more competitive market 
structure. Collie and Le (2015) extends the analysis of Bernhofen (2001) to allow a 
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positive trade cost under both Cournot and Bertrand duopoly. In contrast to Bernhofen 
(2001) who uses the Bowley demand functions, Collie and Le (2015) employ Shubik-
Levitan demand functions as the size of the market will not be affected by a change of 
product differentiation with the Shubik-Levitan demand functions. It is shown that the 
volume of intra-industry trade is positively related to the level of product differentiation 
when the trade cost is relatively high, but is negatively related to the level of product 
differentiation when the trade cost is relatively low. Recently, Brander and Spencer 
(2015) show how the type of market conduct affects the incentive to undertake 
endogenous horizontal product differentiation and investigate the gains from trade 
under Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. It is demonstrated that product differentiation 
plays a key role in determining the pattern of trade, and can increase the gains from 
trade under both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly.   
As mentioned in chapter one that embedding oligopoly model in general 
equilibrium suffers a number of difficulties. Neary has suggested a new approach to 
avoid these problems, which he refers to as general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) 
approach, successfully deriving the equilibrium by assuming simple demand and cost 
functions. According to Neary (2002b, 2003a, 2003b), the GOLE approach relies on a 
simple assumption that firms are large in their own sectors but small in the economy as 
a whole: the economy involves a continuum of sectors and there are just a few 
oligopolists in each sector. Neary (2002b, 2003a, 2003b) argues that, with this setting, 
firms are small in all markets other than their own, they treat factor prices and national 
income as given when choosing the profit-maximising level of output or price. 
Moreover, firms are not able to affect factor rewards while they strategically influence 
the good prices since there is no input-output linkage among sectors that is considered. 
The sensitive issue with the choice of numeraire is addressed by normalizing the 
marginal utility of national income to unity, because the firms are not able to influence 
factor markets and nation-wide income. It is assumed that utility is additively separable 
over goods and each sub-utility function is quadratic. It follows that demands only 
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depend on own price and the marginal utility of income which is a “sufficient statistic” 
for the rest of the economy.  
The GOLE approach has been widely adopted and applied to the recent and 
growing economic research in multiple fields19 . Neary (2016) employs the GOLE 
approach to analyse the existence of gains from trade, the effects on income distribution 
and trade patterns. To be more specific, Neary (2016) considers a two-country model 
with a continuum of sectors, each of which has a small number of firms that compete 
in Cournot fashion. Production of home firms and foreign firms are respectively 
decreasing and increasing in the order of sector, and there is no trade cost or other 
barriers to international trade. When all sectors have identical costs in two identical 
countries (what is called the “featureless” economy in Neary (2002b), there exists no 
gain from trade. If sectors are heterogeneous, there are gains from trade, which is driven 
by the competition effect and the extent of gains is increasing in the comparative 
advantage. Neary (2016) also sheds light on the explanation of the “missing trade 
mystery” stated by Trefler (1995): the volume of real-world trade is far less than 
predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin Model. He shows that the volume of imports and the 
average share of net imports in consumption across all sectors are both increasing in 
the number of firms. Thus oligopoly tends to reduce trade volumes. Bastos and 
Kreickemeier (2009) build a framework that allows for the interaction between 
unionised and non-unionised sectors in general equilibrium, and Kreickemeier and 
Meland (2013) extend the analysis of Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) to allow for 
nontraded goods and the presence of labour unions in some of shielded sectors. Both 
articles show that moving from autarky to free trade will increase the aggregate welfare.  
Bastos and Straume (2012) introduce the degree of horizontal product differentiation 
into a general oligopolistic equilibrium model and study the effect of freer trade on the 
distribution of income, resources allocation and aggregate welfare. It is shown that the 
                                                             
19 See the following articles: Neary (2007) for cross-border mergers; Eckel and Neary (2010), Egger and 
Koch (2012) for multiproduct firms , Basile and De Benedictis (2008) and Neary and Tharakan (2012) 
for unions and unemployment, and Colacicco (2012) for strategic trade policy. Colacicco (2015) provide 
a comprehensive survey on the GOLD model and some of its implications.    
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welfare effect is ambiguous if parts of the economy are shielded from international 
competition. Fujiwara (2017) studies the welfare effects of FDI liberalisation and trade 
liberalisation in a general oligopolistic equilibrium model. It is shown that, when the 
productivity difference between exporting and FDI industries is small enough, trade 
liberalisation improves the aggregate welfare.  
The motivation of this chapter is to analyse the effect of trade costs and product 
differentiation on the economy, including the aggregate profits and social welfare in 
GOLE model. All contributions above in GOLE model simply compare the free trade 
welfare to the autarky welfare. In this analysis, I will show how the trade cost 
continually affects the social welfare from zero trade cost to the prohibitive trade cost. 
More importantly, I will compare the results to that under partial equilibrium. In 
particular, unlike the assumption that wage plays no role in Brander (1981) and Brander 
and Krugman (1983), wage is endogenously determined in GOLE model. I will 
examine how the equilibrium wage affects the whole economy. In addition, the effect 
on price are different from that under partial equilibrium and I will demonstrate the 
relationship between the variability of price and the social welfare in this analysis. This 
chapter is organised in the following way. In section 4.2, products are assumed to be 
differentiated, and the level of technology is identical across all sectors in both countries. 
In section 4.3, products are homogeneous, but there exists comparative advantage for 
both countries. Two cases will then be presented. For the first case, when the trade cost 
is sufficiently low, all firms can supply goods in both markets. In each industry, there 
exists one home firm that competes with its foreign rival. For the second case, when 
the trade cost is sufficiently high, some firms will not export goods. In the absence of 
the foreign firms in the home market, some domestic firms will become the only 
suppliers in their sectors and behave as monopolists. The conclusions are in section 4.4. 
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4.2 Featureless economy with differentiated products 
4.2.1 The model 
Suppose that there are two perfectly symmetric countries, the home country and 
the foreign country, and a continuum of industries, . In each industry, there is 
one home firm that competes with its foreign rival in a Cournot fashion. Therefore, 
firms are considered to be large in their own sectors and have market power in deciding 
their output. However, they are modelled as very small in the economy as a whole, so 
that have ignorable effects on aggregate variables. Labour is the only factor of 
production and the labour market is competitive in both countries. The wage rate is 
endogenously determined and plays a key role in giving the solution of the aggregate 
profits and social welfare in general equilibrium.  
Assume that each country is inhabited by a representative consumer, who owns L 
units of labour. Preferences in the home country are represented by an additively 
separable utility function over a continuum of products, :  
    (4.2.1)  
Each sub-utility function is quadratic and is given by: 
   (4.2.2) 
where  and  are the consumption of the good produced in sector z by 
the domestic firm (denoted as good  ) and the foreign firm (denoted as good 2), 
supplying in the home market.  represents the degree of product differentiation 
and ranges from the case of independent demands ( ) to that of perfect substitutes 
( ). 
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The budget constraint of the representative consumer is given by: 
   (4.2.3) 
where I is the aggregate income and  and  represent the price of good 
1 and good 2 in sector z.  
It is further assumed that wage income and profits will be costlessly distributed to 
the representative consumer, who can use them for the consumption. Therefore, the 
national income is given by the sum of aggregate wage and the aggregate profits:
 where  is the competitive wage level and  stands for the aggregate 
profits.  
The Lagrangian function can be written as: 
           1 1 1 1 2 20 0u x z dz p z x z p z x z I          L   (4.2.4) 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.   
The first-order conditions are as follows: 
   (4.2.5) 
   (4.2.6) 
   (4.2.7) 
Combining (4.2.5) and (4.2.6), the linear inverse demand function formulates as: 
   (4.2.8) 
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By rearranging (4.2.8), the direct demand function displays as: 
   (4.2.9) 
The Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, as usual, measures the marginal 
utility of national income. It can be expressed by substituting (4.2.9) into (4.2.3) and 
integrating over all sectors: 
   (4.2.10) 
Where  ,    
1 2 2
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.  
 is the measure of the first moment of the price distribution across all sectors, 
 stands for the second moment of the price distribution,  measures the covariance 
between the price of two goods. It is worth mentioning that, as can be seen below, the 
value of   is not independent in general equilibrium. All nominal variables are 
interpreted as relative to the inverse of the marginal utility of national income ( ). 
Firms have complete information and compete under Cournot competition, 
selecting their own profit-maximising production and treating the outputs of their rival 
as given. The “large in the small but small in the large” assumption suggests that firms 
take  as given when deciding output as each firm is unlikely to impact the price 
distribution, factor reward as well as national income. 
The wage rate  can be pinned down since the labours can move across all sectors 
freely. The cost function is linear in the output owing to the assumption of the constant 
return to the scale of technology. Each domestic firm maximises its profits subject to 
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the inverse demand function (4.2.8) given that the outputs of rivals and wage rate are 
known: 
   (4.2.11) 
where  represents the home sales of the domestic firm and  is the 
marginal cost of the home firm in sector z. Asterisk measures variables in the foreign 
market.  is the level of exports for the home firms in sector z. The linearity in the 
inverse demand and cost functions ensures that there exists unique Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies and no firm is willing to move away from this equilibrium. 
The marginal cost in sector z is endogenously determined which depends on the 
competitive wage rate and sector-specific labour input requirement. Therefore, the 
marginal cost of the domestic firm in sector z is written as: 
   (4.2.12) 
where  is the unit labour requirement of production in sector . 
Similarly, the profit of the foreign firm in sector z obtains as:  
   (4.2.13) 
where and  are the sales of the foreign firm supplying the domestic 
market and foreign market,  is the marginal cost of the foreign firms and ( )z  is 
the trade cost per-unit of exports. 
The marginal cost of the foreign firm in sector z formulates as 
   (4.2.14) 
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The trade cost per unit of exports in sector  is expressed as  
 ( ) ( )z wt z    (4.2.15) 
where  is the trade costs in terms of labour. For simplify,  is assumed to 
be constant across all sectors, i.e. . 
Market clearing condition implies that consumption equals to production:  
   (4.2.16) 
Substituting the inverse demand function (4.2.8) into (4.2.11) and (4.2.13) and 
solving the system of the first-order conditions gives the best response function. Thus, 
the Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium productions of the domestic firm and foreign firm 
in the home market are represented as:  
   (4.2.17) 
   (4.2.18) 
Due to the full symmetry, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium productions of the 
domestic firm and foreign firm in the foreign market can be represented as: 
   (4.2.19) 
   (4.2.20) 
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The profit of domestic firm in sector z can be written as: 
   (4.2.21) 
The profits of the home firm in sector  stem from the profits from the domestic 
market and the foreign market . 
The aggregate profits of the home firms are given by: 
   (4.2.22) 
The full employment condition suggests that the exogenous total labour supply  
equals to the total labour demand: 
   (4.2.23) 
In this section, it is assumed that there is no comparative advantage and all firms 
have identical labour input requirement: 
   (4.2.24) 
The first and second moment of unit labour requirement obtain as  
   (4.2.25) 
   (4.2.26) 
Now the equilibrium wage rate can be solved by substituting (4.2.17) and (4.2.18) 
into (4.2.23), integrating over all sectors and combining with (4.2.25) and (4.2.26):   
   (4.2.27) 
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Alternatively, we can express the consumer’s real wage as: 
   (4.2.28) 
By symmetry, the equilibrium wage rate in the foreign country is also . It is worth 
noting that each domestic and foreign firms have the same marginal cost in sector z 
with the same competitive wage rate and unit labour requirement of production. This is 
what Neary called the “featureless economy”. 
Substituting the competitive wage rate into the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
productions (4.2.17) – (4.2.20): 
   (4.2.29) 
   (4.2.30) 
   (4.2.31) 
   (4.2.32) 
As shown in Appendix C1 and C2 that 1 / 0
CNy t    and 2 / 0
CNy t    , which 
means that an increase in the trade costs will lead to an increase in home sales, but a 
reduction in exports. 
In the featureless economy, as  does not enter the solution for the production, the 
above four expressions also display the aggregate production level. In particular, the 
total consumption in the home country can be calculated as: 
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Notice that if the trade cost is too high, it will expel the foreign firms from the 
domestic market, i.e., the foreign firms will not export, and the home firm in each sector 
will be the sole supplier in the home market. This will occur when the level of export 
is zero: 
   (4.2.34) 
Solving (4.2.34) yields the prohibitive trade level:  
   (4.2.35) 
If the trade cost is below  , the home firms compete with their foreign rivals. 
However, if the trade cost exceeds , all foreign firms will not export goods to the 
home market and all domestic firms will become monopolists in their industries. 
4.2.2 The equilibrium wage  
One distinct feature of GOLE approach is that，wage is endogenously determined 
and it plays a key role in solving the aggregative variables. Unlike the conventional 
assumption that marginal cost is constant under partial equilibrium, in GOLE approach, 
marginal cost is measured by the product of wage rate and unit labour requirement. 
Therefore, a change in trade costs will affect the competitive wage, resulting in a change 
in the production costs. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the effect of trade costs 
on the equilibrium wage. 
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When the trade cost is prohibitive, i.e., , the equilibrium wage rate is obtained 
as: 
   (4.2.36) 
The first-order derivative of wage with respect to   when the trade cost is 
prohibitive obtains as:  
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where    2 2 2 21 2 2b L r abL r a       . 
It is shown in Appendix C1 that 1 0   
. It follows that  is negative. Hence, a 
reduction in trade costs leads to an increase in the competitive wage when t is 
prohibitive. 
In the case of zero trade cost, the equilibrium wage calculates as: 
   (4.2.38) 
It is easy to check that , that is, the equilibrium wage at zero trade cost 
is higher than that at prohibitive trade cost.  
The first-order derivative of wage with respect to  at zero trade cost obtains as: 
   (4.2.39) 
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The effect is ambiguous when . The equilibrium wage is increasing in  at 
zero trade cost only when  . 
Figure 4-1 and figure 4-2 show two possible shapes of the equilibrium wage on the 
trade costs: 
1. The equilibrium wage is monotonically decreasing in trade costs given 
the following parameter values 10, 1, 10, 3, 0.5a b L r     . This can be seen 
from figure 4-1.  
2. The wage curve is increasing in trade costs when  is close to zero, but 
starts falling after the wage reaches its maximum, given the following parameter 
values . This can be seen from figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4–2: Wage rate with trade cost II 
Labour supply is exogenous and fixed, and labour demand is determined by the 
labour input requirement, the level of output and the trade costs as shown in (4.2.23). 
The full employment condition implies that an increase in wage is driven by a higher 
labour demand across all sectors. 
As the home sales and exports are identical for the firms across all sectors, the 
function of total labour demand can be simplified as: 
   (4.2.40) 
Taking the derivative of total labour demand with respect to  gives: 
   (4.2.41) 
If , a reduction in trade cost will lead to a higher 
demand for labour. Therefore, a reduction in trade cost will raise the equilibrium wage. 
This is more likely to happen when the trade cost is relatively high: For one thing,  in 
the bracket on the left-hand-side of the inequality is large. For another,  on the 
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right-hand-side of the inequality is small. As can be seen from figure 4-1 and figure 4-
2, the equilibrium rate is decreasing in trade cost when trade cost is high.  
Starting from the prohibitive trade cost, if there is a reduction in , the home sales 
 decrease while the exports  increase, labour will be redistributed. As the 
labours demanded for producing good 2 outweigh the labours sacked from the sectors 
that produce good 1, the overall demand for labour increases. As a result, wage rate will 
increase. When  is close to zero, the effect of trade costs on wage is ambiguous. This 
is because the inequality  may be reversed:  is small 
while the exports are large when the trade cost is low. To be concluded, in the GOLE 
approach, a change in trade cost has an impact on the competitive wage due to the 
change in labour demand. 
Recall the function of the trade costs per-unit of exports in (4.2.15),  is measured 
in terms of labour, the competitive wage responds to the change of t  and also has an 
impact on the trade costs per-unit of exports  . Therefore, it is worth seeing the effect 
of t  on  . 
 As shown in Appendix C3 that 0t    for all possible values of . Hence, trade 
costs per-unit of exports  and unit labour requirement of exports  are positively 
related. With a reduction in , though wage rate may increase especially when  is high, 
the trade cost per-unit of exports will always fall. 
4.2.3 The aggregate profits and social welfare 
The domestic aggregate proﬁts are comprised of two parts: the profits from 
domestic sales and the profits from exporting. The first component of profit can be 
obtained as: 
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   (4.2.42) 
The domestic firms make the following aggregate profits from exporting:  
   (4.2.43) 
The aggregate profits can then be calculated by summing (4.2.42) and (4.2.43): 
      
 (4.2.44) 
Finally, in order to obtain the social welfare function, substituting (4.2.29) and 
(4.2.31) into (4.2.2) and integrating over all sectors yields:  
   (4.2.45) 
where  ;   ;
 ;   
  and
 
According to the aggregate profits function (4.2.44), calculate the first-order 
derivative at zero trade cost: 
   (4.2.46) 
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It reveals that an increase in the trade cost will lead to a drop in the aggregate profits 
in the neighbourhood of zero trade cost. In particular, the measurement of product 
differentiation  does not enter the first-order derivative above.  
As the aggregate profits are comprised of the profits from the domestic and foreign 
market, the effect of trade cost on profits can be divided into the following two parts: 
one on the profits from home sales and the other on the profits from exporting. Recall 
(4.2.22), and separately analyse the impact of trade cost on profits from two markets: 
   (4.2.47) 
As can be seen from above, trade cost is positively related to the profits from 
domestic market while negatively related to the profits from exporting. The intuition is 
as follows. An increase in t  leads to a higher marginal cost for export goods ( tw ), 
resulting in a fall in the level of exports as well as the profit from international trade. 
Therefore, trade cost has a negative effect. On the other hand, the foreign firms confront 
the same problem so that they will reduce the supply in the home market and home 
firms benefit. As the overall effect on the aggregate profits is negative, one can conclude 
that, in the case of zero trade cost, exports are harmed by a rise in the firm’s own cost 
more than home sales are helped by the same increase in the other firm’s marginal costs. 
Accordingly, consumers will consume more goods produced by the home firms but 
fewer goods supplied by the foreign firm, and the overall consumption will decrease. 
Therefore, a tiny increase in t results in a decrease in total consumption and profits. 
This conclusion is in line with Brander and Krugman (1983). 
In the neighbourhood of the prohibitive trade cost, the first-order effect shows: 
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As it is shown in Appendix C1 that 1 0   
, is positive. 
When the trade cost is evaluated at the prohibitive trade cost, exports are zero at 
the beginning. Hence, a small reduction in trade cost has zero effect on profits from 
international trade. However, profits from home market reduce due to a small fall in 
trade cost as they were at the monopoly level before the change of trade costs. In 
addition, a reduction in  at the prohibitive trade cost will unambiguously increase the 
competitive wage rate  , and in turn, increase the marginal cost of production. 
Therefore, a reduction in the trade cost evaluated at the prohibitive trade cost will lead 
the aggregate profits to fall.  
Figure 4-3 shows the relationship between the aggregate profits and trade costs 
given the following parameter values 10, 1, 10, 3, 0.25 / 0.5 / 0.75a b L r     . 
 
Figure 4–3: Aggregate profits with trade cost in the featureless economy 
It shows that the aggregate profits are decreasing in  when the trade cost is 
sufficiently low. If the trade cost is close to the prohibitive trade cost , the aggregate 
profits are positively related to the trade costs. If the trade cost exceeds , there is no 
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export from the foreign firms and the domestic firms will be monopolists in their own 
sectors, and the aggregate profits are constant at the monopoly level. 
In order to examine the effect of trade cost on social welfare at zero trade cost, 
derive the first-order derivative of social welfare with respect to  and evaluate  to 
zero: 
   (4.2.49) 
It is clear that social welfare is harmed by an increase in trade cost when trade cost 
is zero. 
On the other hand, when the trade cost is prohibitive, the first-order derivative 
shows 
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It indicates that a decrease in the trade cost evaluated at the prohibitive trade cost 
will lower the social welfare: 
To see how trade costs affect the social welfare, figure 4-4 is drawn with the 
parameter values:  . It is clearly shown 
that social welfare is U-shaped in the trade cost. 
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Figure 4–4: Social welfare with trade cost in the featureless economy 
The results mentioned above lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: In the featureless economy  the aggregate profits and social welfare 
are decreasing in  in the neighbourhood of zero trade cost  and increasing in  in the 
neighbourhood of the prohibitive trade cost. 
The social welfare in the case of zero trade cost can be calculated as 
   (4.2.51) 
The first-order derivative with respect to   show that 
0
/ 0
t
U r

    . This 
suggests that the social welfare is higher if the goods are more differentiated when the 
trade cost is zero. This can also be seen from figure 4-4. 
When the trade cost is prohibitive, the social welfare obtains as: 
   (4.2.52) 
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Since there is no trade between two countries, the representative consumer in home 
country can only consume goods produced by the home firms. Therefore, the degree of 
product differentiation does not enter function (4.2.52). 
Proposition 2: There are losses from trade when the trade cost is close to the 
prohibitive level in the featureless economy  and social welfare under zero trade cost is 
always greater than that under prohibitive trade cost if the products are differentiated. 
Proof. 
Calculate the gap between the social welfare under zero trade cost (4.2.51) and the 
prohibitive trade cost (4.2.52): 
   (4.2.53) 
      Q.E.D. 
It implies that when the goods are identical (i.e., ), the social welfare under 
zero trade cost is the same as that of prohibitive trade cost. If the products are 
differentiated, i.e., 1 0r  , welfare under zero trade cost is always greater than that 
under prohibitive trade cost.  
In summary, in the featureless economy, it suggests that there is a U-shape 
relationship between social welfare and trade cost. Besides, there are gains from trade 
unless the products are perfect substitutes. However, the result is subject to the simplest 
assumption with two identical countries and the same technology level across all sectors 
(i.e., the featureless economy). In the next section, it is assumed that the level of 
technology differs across sectors so that it allows for comparative advantage between 
two countries.
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4.3 The economy with comparative advantage and homogeneous 
products 
4.3.1 The model 
Assume the country is populated by a representative consumer with L units of 
labour, inelastically supplied to a perfectly competitive labour market. It is assumed 
that preferences are additively separable over a continuum of goods and the products 
are homogeneous. 
The utility function for the representative consumer is given by: 
                                                                                    (4.3.1) 
Any quadratic sub-utility function is given by: 
   (4.3.2) 
The utility function is maximised subject to the budget constraint: 
   (4.3.3) 
The Lagrangian function obtains as: 
   (4.3.4) 
For a representative sector, the first-order conditions imply: 
   (4.3.5) 
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   (4.3.6) 
   (4.3.7) 
As can be seen from expression (4.3.5) and (4.3.6), the linear inverse demand 
function formulates as: 
   (4.3.8) 
Solving for  by multiplying demand function in (4.3.8) by  and substituting 
into the budget constraint gives    
The impacts of prices on  can be summarised by two price terms  and , 
which are the first and the second moments of the distribution of prices: 
 and .  
Under Cournot competition, each domestic firm maximises its profits subject to 
the inverse demand function (4.3.8) given that the outputs of rivals and wage rate are 
known. The profits of the domestic firm in industry  are given by the sum of its profits 
obtained from the domestic market and foreign market: 
    (4.3.9) 
The marginal cost of the home firm in sector z formulates as: 
   (4.3.10) 
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Similarly, the profit of the foreign firm in sector z obtains as:  
   (4.3.11) 
The marginal cost of the foreign firm in sector z formulates as 
   (4.3.12) 
Assume that all firms have the same trade cost in terms of labour, the trade costs 
per-unit of exports can be written as  
   (4.3.13) 
Market clearing condition implies that all goods produced by domestic and foreign 
firms will be exactly consumed:  
   (4.3.14) 
Substituting the inverse demand function into the problem of both the home and 
foreign firm in sector  and solving the system of first-order conditions yields the best 
response function. Thus, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium productions of the domestic 
firm and foreign firm in the home market in sector z can be expressed as:  
   (4.3.15) 
   (4.3.16) 
The superscript  is short for Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs. 
Similarly, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium productions of the home firm and foreign 
firm in foreign market in sector z can be expressed as: 
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   (4.3.17) 
   (4.3.18) 
Regarding the level of technology, it is assumed that the unit labour requirement of 
the home firms increases in z while the unit labour requirement of the foreign firms 
decreases in z. The function of unit labour requirement for the home and foreign country 
can be seen as following   
   (4.3.19) 
   (4.3.20) 
where  is assumed to be positive. With a higher value of , firms need more 
units of labour in the production, which follows a reduction in the technology level. 
According to (4.3.19) and (4.3.20), that home country has an advantage from sector 
0 to 0.5, while the foreign country is more productive from sector 0.5 to 1. This can be 
clearly seen from the following diagram.  
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Figure 4–5: Comparison of the productivity for the two countries 
The domestic aggregate profits are given by the sum of profits from domestic sales 
and total exports. Suppose that all home firms can make positive profits from exporting 
so that they supply both markets. The aggregate profits can be expressed as: 
   (4.3.21) 
It is possible that some firms do not export in equilibrium due to a high trade cost. 
As the technology level of the home country decreases in z  the aggregate profits are 
represented as: 
   (4.3.22) 
where n is the last domestic industry that still exports goods to the foreign country.  
It is of convenience to use what is called “Frisch indirect utility function” to express 
the levels of utility with quadratic preferences. An important property of this form of 
utility function is that utility can be written as a function of prices and the marginal 
utility of income. To do this, substitute the demand function (4.3.8) into the direct utility 
function (4.3.2) and integrate over all sectors:   
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Where . 
Therefore, the social welfare depends on the variability of price: reducing price 
variability across sectors will raise the social welfare. 
Ignoring the constant term, utility equals to minus the product of the squared 
marginal utility of income and the second moment of prices. Define  as . Then 
social welfare  and  are related as: 
   (4.3.25) 
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4.3.2 Case 1: All domestic and foreign firms are active in the markets. 
The condition of full employment suggests that the total labour demand equals to 
the exogenous labour supply: 
   (4.3.26) 
L is the total labour supply in the home country and the RHS of (4.3.26) is the total 
labour demand, summing up the labour demand from supplying the domestic and 
foreign markets. 
The competitive wage rate in home country can be solved by substituting (4.3.15), 
(4.3.17) and (4.3.19) into (4.3.26).  
   (4.3.27) 
Labour market clearing condition in the foreign country shows that: 
   (4.3.28) 
4.3.2.1 The equilibrium wage 
The competitive wage rate in the foreign country can be solved by substituting 
(4.3.16), (4.3.18) and (4.3.20) into (4.3.28): 
   (4.3.29) 
The equilibrium wage rate in the foreign country is the same as in the home country. 
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One can display the consumer’s real wage as: 
   (4.3.30) 
Under zero trade cost, the equilibrium wage rate becomes  
   (4.3.31) 
It is natural to assume a positive wage rate. Thus, it follows that . 
Taking the derivative of  with respect to  and evaluating it at  yields: 
 
The effect of trade costs on the equilibrium wage rate is ambiguous when . 
Only if the given labour supply is sufficiently large ( ), an increase in  
will cause a rise in the equilibrium wage in the neighbourhood of zero trade cost.  
The trade cost per-unit of exports is unambiguously increasing in  at zero trade 
cost: . It implies that a rise in  will increase the marginal 
cost of the export goods at zero trade cost. 
Substitute the equilibrium wage rate into the equilibrium outputs (4.3.15) -(4.3.18): 
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(4.3.33) 
    
(4.3.34) 
  
(4.3.35) 
As mentioned above, the home country is more efficient and has a comparative 
advantage with lower values of z. It can be seen from (4.3.32) and (4.3.34) that the 
outputs of the home firm are decreasing in z. By contrast, the outputs of the foreign firm 
are positively related to z. 
Due to the fact that an increase in trade cost will lessen the profit as well as the 
level of exports, those firms with relatively lower technology do not export if the trade 
cost is set to be too high for them (i.e., marginal cost is too expensive). There must exist 
a critical trade cost that the firm with the lowest technology still survives in the opposite 
market. In order to find out this critical value, we focus on the foreign firm with highest 
labour input requirement that does not export. As the technology level of the foreign 
country is increasing in z  the critical trade level  can be calculated by setting 0z  : 
 1 0z d    and  2 0 1z d    .  
Substituting the two labour input requirements into (4.3.35) and solving the trade 
cost when the output is zero. The critical trade cost can be solved: 
  ;  (4.3.36) 
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It is clear that the when the trade cost is below  , all the 
domestic and foreign firms supply both markets. While, if trade cost exceeds this 
critical value, the low-technology firms will be efficiently dropped out of the market. 
4.3.2.2 The aggregate profits and social welfare 
Note that for all . It can be clearly seen 
from the above equation that sector z disappears when summing up labour input 
requirements for home and foreign market in each sector. As shown below, the 
aggregate profits, consumption level and equilibrium price will also be the same across 
all sectors. 
Summing (4.3.32) and (4.3.33), the consumption level for the representative 
consumer in each sector can be calculated as: 
   (4.3.37) 
As z does not enter (4.3.37), the aggregate consumption is the same as  
( ). Obtain the first-order derivative at zero trade cost: 
   (4.3.38) 
This follows that the representative agent’s consumption is harmed by the 
introduction of trade cost.  
The aggregate profits can be measured by the sum of profits from domestic and 
foreign sales: 
   (4.3.39) 
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Substituting (4.3.32) and (4.3.34) into the aggregate profits function and 
integrating over all sectors: 
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  (4.3.40) 
To see how trade cost affects the profit at zero trade cost, partially differentiating 
the aggregate profits with respect to  and evaluating it at 20: 
 
 (4.3.41) 
It is clear that the aggregate home profits decrease for a tiny increase in  at zero 
trade cost. This is because the combination of home sales and exports fall with an 
increase in  when the initial trade cost is zero. 
Substituting (4.3.37) into (4.3.8) yields the equilibrium prices:  
   (4.3.42) 
Alternatively, the real price can be written as: 
   (4.3.43) 
 
 
                                                             
20 See Appendix C4 for the proof. 
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Taking the derivative of  with respect to  and evaluating it at  gives: 
   (4.3.44) 
It follows that an increase in  at zero trade cost will increase the equilibrium price. 
 Lastly, substituting the second moment of prices into (4.3.25) yields the social 
welfare: 
  (4.3.45) 
At zero trade cost, the first-order derivative shows that21 
  (4.3.46) 
Starting from zero trade cost, a small increase in  will lead to a fall in social 
welfare. This is because the equilibrium price will become more variable if there is an 
increase in  at zero trade cost. 
The results mentioned above lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: An increase in trade cost will lower the aggregate profits and social 
welfare in general equilibrium when the trade cost is zero. 
In order to examine how the trade cost affects the social welfare at , obtain the 
following partial derivative:  
                                                             
21 See the Appendix C5 for the proof. 
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 (4.3.47) 
There are two possibilities22:  
1. If , then  
2. If , then  
Therefore, the effect is ambiguous at the critical trade level . Social welfare can 
be decreasing or increasing in the trade cost at . However, one may ask what would 
happen to the economy if the trade costs continue growing and exceed  so that the 
low-technology firms start to drop out of the market? And more importantly, are there 
gains from trade from the viewpoint of social welfare? The following analysis will offer 
the answers.    
 
                                                             
22 See Appendix C6 for more details 
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4.3.3 Case 2: some firms do not export due to a high trade cost 
Suppose that trade cost exceeds prohibitive trade level , 
then some foreign firms with low technology do not supply the home market and 
similarly, due to the full symmetry, the less efficient domestic firms do not export. 
 
    
  d+1                                                             
 
       
             d                                                               
       
0         h                                  1-h        1 
Figure 4–6: Labour input requirements of the two countries 
The industry with the lowest technology will be firstly dropped out when there is 
a tiny increase in trade cost at . With the increasing trade cost, more foreign firms 
with relatively low technology do not supply the home market. The diagram above 
shows the case that the domestic firm in sector  is producing zero output for 
exports. In other words, in the home country, only the firms in sector  will 
supply the foreign market. By symmetry, only the foreign firms in sector  will 
export goods to the home country. 
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4.3.3.1 The monopoly sectors 
Notice that the domestic firm in any sector z between  is a monopoly since a 
high trade costs prevent the foreign firms in the relevant industries from entering the 
home market. If there is an increase in the trade costs, more foreign firms will not export 
and therefore, h will rise. 
Now consider the case that the domestic firms behave as monopolists in the sector 
.  
The quadratic sub-utility function now becomes 
   (4.3.48) 
The linear inverse demand function formulates as: 
   (4.3.49) 
As a monopoly, each domestic firm maximises the following profits: 
   (4.3.50) 
Market clearing condition implies that all goods produced by the domestic firm 
will be exactly consumed by the representative consumer, i.e.   
Substituting the inverse demand function (4.3.49) into (4.3.50), the monopoly 
output in sector  can be expressed as:  
   (4.3.51) 
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The superscript m is short for monopoly.  represents the sales of the home 
firm in sector  0,  z h . 
Now consider the whole economy: firms in sector .behave as 
monopolists while firms in  compete with the foreign firms. The condition of 
full employment suggests that the total labour demand equals to the exogenous labour 
supply L: 
   (4.3.52) 
The total labour demand is comprised of the following three parts. This first 
component  shows how many units of labour are needed when 
domestic firms are monopolies in . For , domestic and foreign firms 
compete with each other in the home market.  represents the total 
labour demand when the foreign firms supply the home market. For any sector between 
0 and 1-h, domestic firms export goods to the foreign market, and due to a high trade 
cost, domestic firms in sectors between 1-h and 1 will be efficiently dropped out of the 
foreign market. Therefore,  indicates the total labour demand 
for supplying the foreign market.  
4.3.3.2 The equilibrium wage 
Substituting (4.3.51), (4.3.15) and (4.3.17) into (4.3.52), integrating across the 
relevant sectors, the equilibrium wage rate can be solved as: 
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h is endogenously determined by the trade cost. The prohibitive trade cost prevents 
the foreign firms from exporting. Denote  t h  as the prohibitive trade level for the 
foreign firms in sector h. The labour unit requirement of the domestic and foreign firm 
in sector h are  1 h d h     and  2 1h d h      respectively. By substituting 
(4.3.53) into (4.3.16), the exports by the foreign firm in sector h can be calculated as: 
(4.3.54) 
In sector h, the exports of the firm are zero, i.e.,  . The corresponding 
prohibitive trade cost in sector h can be solved as: 
 
 (4.3.55) 
The first-order derivative shows: 
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 (4.3.56) 
 It is shown in Appendix C7 that   /t h h   is positive. It implies that an increase 
in trade costs will lead more foreign firms to leave the domestic market and accordingly  
h will be higher. 
Since the unit labour requirement is decreasing in z in the foreign country, the 
foreign firm in sector 0 is the least efficient. By setting  and substituting into 
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(4.3.55), the prohibitive trade level for the foreign firm in sector 0 is calculated as 
. Unsurprisingly, the result is consistent with (4.3.36). 
All domestic and foreign firms supply goods in both markets if the trade cost is 
below  . However, if trade cost exceeds  , the low efficient firms will be 
dropped out of the markets.  
If the trade cost increases to an extraordinarily high level that expels all foreign 
firm from entering the home market. It is easy to obtain the prohibitive trade cost at 
autarky by setting :   
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If trade cost exceeds , the economy will become an autarky, i.e., there is no 
trade between two countries 
Substituting (4.3.55) into (4.3.53), the reduced form of equilibrium wage rate can 
be obtained as23: 
  (4.3.58) 
The competitive wage rate at the prohibitive trade cost  obtains as: 
   (4.3.59) 
                                                             
23 It is more convenient to express the variables as a function of  t h  so that the effect of trade cost on 
the economy is straightforward. However, the formulas containing  t h  are too complicated. Indeed, 
because h is endogenous and determined by the trade cost, expressing in term of  t h  or  h t   is a matter 
of no importance. 
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It is shown in Appendix C8 that . The wage rate at zero trade cost is 
unambiguous larger than that at the prohibitive trade cost. 
The effect of trade cost on the equilibrium wage rate at the prohibitive trade cost 
can obtain as: 
 
  1
0
h t
w
h t




  (4.3.60) 
It shows that a small change of trade cost at autarky has no effect on the wage rate, 
and as can be seen below, it also has no effect on aggregate profits and social welfare. 
Suppose that the trade cost is prohibitive, i.e., , the most efficient foreign 
firm in sector 0 is now making zero profits in the home market and the economy is of 
autarky. Unlike the case that all foreign firms have the same cost, the foreign industries 
are ordered in terms of technology, i.e., from the most efficient ( ) to the lowest 
efficient ( ). Also, the model is assumed to have a continuum of sectors. Therefore, 
a small reduction in  may have very little impact on the number of foreign firms that 
will enter the home market and compete with the home firms. Neary (2016) has 
provided a similar intuition: “labor demand is unaffected by small changes in the 
threshold sectors. Changes in either of these thresholds implies entry or exit of extra 
firms which are just at the margin of profitability”. If there is a small reduction in  at 
the prohibitive trade cost, the labour demand remains constant. As a result, the effect 
on aggregate labour demand can be ignored.  
In order to have a better view of how trade cost affects the equilibrium wage, we 
assign specific values on the parameters.  
The effect of trade costs on the equilibrium wage can be seen from figure 4-7 with 
the parameter values: 10, 1, 10, 2a b L d    .  
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Figure 4–7: Trade cost and wage rate 
Figure 4-7 suggests that a reduction in trade costs will lead to an increase in the 
equilibrium wage rate when trade cost is relatively high. As has been shown in section 
4.2, the effect is because of a redistribution of labour: at the extensive margin, some 
firms with high technology level will be able to compete and export in response to a 
reduction in . As a result, the equilibrium wage  will increase due to an increase in 
overall demand for labour. The effect of  on the wage at zero trade cost has been 
shown in the analysis of case 1: the effect is ambiguous and depends on the specific 
values of parameters.  
Next, consider the effect of trade costs on the equilibrium prices. 
The consumption level is identical for sector  in the home country, using 
, we have: 
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The first moment of the distribution of prices obtains as: 
   (4.3.62) 
As , a reduction in the trade cost evaluated at the prohibitive trade 
cost has zero effect on the first moment of the distribution of prices.  
Figure 4-8 shows the effect of trade cost on the price with the parameter values: 
 . 
 
Figure 4–8: Trade cost and the first moment of prices distribution 
It can be clearly seen from figure 4-8 that, the first moment of prices is a hump-
shaped function in the trade costs. The intuitions are given as follows. Starting from the 
prohibitive trade cost, if there is a reduction in trade cost at the extensive margin, the 
wage will lead to an increase in the labour demand. This raises production costs for 
firms across all sectors. Consequently, the price will increase in response to an increase 
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in production costs. On the other hand, the competition effect tends to reduce the price 
if there is a reduction in trade costs. When the trade cost is sufficiently high, the 
competition effect is dominated by the high production costs and a reduction in the 
trade cost leads to higher consumer prices. When the trade cost is relatively small, the 
competition effect outweighs the effect of the production cost, and a reduction in the 
trade cost leads the price to fall.  
Substituting (4.3.58) into (4.3.51) and (4.3.15) -(4.3.18) yield the equilibrium 
productions: 
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 (4.3.67) 
4.3.3.3 The aggregate profits and welfare 
The aggregate profits can be expressed as24: 
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           (4.3.68) 
The first term measures the aggregate profits from sector  , where the 
home firms behave as monopolists in the home market and compete with the foreign 
firms in the foreign market. The second term represents the total profits from sector 
, where both domestic and foreign firms compete with each other in both 
markets. The last term captures the aggregate profits from the sector  , 
where domestic firms do not export due to the prohibitive trade cost. 
Substituting (4.3.63), (4.3.64) and (4.3.66) into the equation of aggregate profit 
yields: 
   (4.3.69) 
 
                                                             
24 Notice that the equation suits for any h less than 1/2. If h is greater than 1/2, then the aggregate 
profits should be express as:           
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with  
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In order to analyse the effect of trade cost on the aggregate profits at autarky, 
partially differentiating with respect to  and evaluating it at  gives: 
   (4.3.70) 
It shows that a small change of  has no effect on the aggregate profits since there 
are no entry or exit of extra firms. 
The effect of trade cost on aggregate profits can be seen from figure 4-9 with the 
parameter values:  . 
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Figure 4–9: Trade cost and the aggregate profits 
Figure 4-9 shows that the aggregate profits are decreasing in  when the trade cost 
is initially zero. The intuition has been demonstrated in the case 1. If the trade cost is 
relatively high, the aggregate profits are positively related to the trade costs. If the trade 
cost is prohibitive, a reduction in t  leads the wage to increase, the production costs will 
be higher, and as a result, the aggregate profits will fall. 
Now consider the effect of trade costs on the social welfare. 
The second moment of the distribution of prices obtains as: 
   (4.3.71) 
Substituting (4.3.61) and (4.3.51) into (4.3.71) and substituting the second moment 
of prices into (4.3.25) yields the aggregate social welfare: 
   (4.3.72) 
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with
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Examine the effect of trade cost on social welfare when h equals to 0: 
  
 (4.3.73) 
 There are two possibilities:  
1. If , then   
2. If , then   
Again, these results are consistent with section 4.2 above. 
Regarding the case of autarky when , the first-order derivative obtains as 
    (4.3.74) 
Therefore, social welfare remains constant with a small change of trade cost at 
autarky.  
As has been explained above, the effect of trade costs on the aggregate variables in 
the neighbourhood of autarky can be ignored. 
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Proposition 4: Social welfare when the trade cost is zero is higher than the social 
welfare when the trade cost is at the prohibitive level in general equilibrium. 
Proof.  
By substituting  into the social welfare function (4.3.45), the social welfare 
under zero trade cost obtains as: 
   (4.3.75) 
Substituting  into (4.3.72), the social welfare under autarky obtains as: 
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  (4.3.76) 
Alternatively, recall the analysis of the monopoly sector from (4.3.48) -(4.3.51). If 
the economy is an autarky, then . The condition of full employment implies: 
   (4.3.77) 
Substitute the monopoly output into the condition above, the equilibrium wage 
under autarky obtains as: 
   (4.3.78) 
The monopoly price is obtained as: 
   (4.3.79) 
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Lastly, substitute the second moment of the monopoly prices into (4.3.25) yields 
the aggregate social welfare: 
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  (4.3.80) 
Define  as the gap between social welfare under zero trade cost and under 
prohibitive trade cost: 
   
 
   
 
     
   
2 2 3 4 2 3 2 2 2
2
2 2
0
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
5 2
6 2 6 3 1
3 324 79
1 2 13 48 8 48
9
1 2 48
3 2 2
2 36 468 48 5 22 36 4 144 2
1 16 1 3
5 5
144 1 2 2 1 3 3
3
a
t
U U U
a d d d bL a d d ab d L b L
d d d d
a d d d d ab d d d L b d d L
d d d d



 


    
        


   
   
  
 




 
Denote , the numerator can be expressed as the following: 
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The discriminant of the quadratic function is calculated as: 
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Therefore,  and . 
Q.E.D. 
As in the partial equilibrium, there are gains from trade under general equilibrium. 
As has shown under the “featureless economy” without comparative advantage, social 
welfare is identical under zero trade cost and autarky if the products are identical. 
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However, though the products are homogeneous, social welfare at zero trade costs is 
still higher than the autarky welfare if there exists comparative advantage across 
industries. This confirms that one source of the gains from trade is the existence of the 
comparative advantage. 
The “real” social welfare can be obtained from equation (4.3.25):  
As mentioned above, the effect of trade costs on social welfare at  depends on 
the values of parameters. Therefore, two groups of parameter values will be considered. 
The first group of parameter values follows that  
The effect of trade cost on social welfare can be seen from figure 4-10 with the 
parameter values: .  
 
Figure 4–10: Social welfare with trade cost I 
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The second group of parameter values ensures that . 
The effect of trade cost on social welfare can be seen from figure 4-11 with the 
parameter values: .  
 
Figure 4–11: Social welfare with trade cost II 
The diagrams above suggest that an increase in  will lower both aggregate profits 
and social welfare. This is because, with a higher value of d  , the unit labour 
requirement will increase, and as a result, the firms will become less efficient.  
Figure 4-10 and figure 4-11 also suggest that social welfare is a U-shape function 
in the trade costs. Following Neary (2016), the relationship between social welfare and 
trade costs can be explained by the change of the variability of prices. Starting from 
zero trade cost, prices tend to increase, raising their variability and so reducing the 
social welfare. On the other hand, if the trade cost is initially at the prohibitive level, 
prices tend to increase in response to an increase in . Again the variability of prices 
will increase so that the social welfare will fall.   
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4.4 Conclusion 
Unlike the usual analysis under partial equilibrium, the wage is endogenously 
determined by the full employment condition in the general equilibrium. A reduction in 
trade cost will increase the competitive wage particularly when the trade cost is high. 
This is because the labour will be redistributed and the total labour demand exceeds the 
total labour supply. Since wage is not fixed under general equilibrium, the trend of 
prices is totally different from that in partial equilibrium. In the analysis of partial 
equilibrium, a reduction in trade costs always lowers the prices to the home consumers. 
However, as the Ricardian cost structure is used in the GOLE approach：the costs are 
the products of the wage and unit labour requirement. Therefore, prices are also affected 
by the change of costs. It is shown that，when the products are homogeneous, prices 
are hump-shaped in the trade costs, increasing in  when the trade cost is small and 
decreasing in  when the trade cost is sufficiently high. 
In the featureless economy where the labour input requirement is identical for all 
firms in both countries, social welfare has a U-shape relation with the trade costs, 
reaching its minimum level below the prohibitive trade level at autarky. Also, there are 
gains from trade if the products are differentiated. This suggests that love-of-variety is 
one source of the gains from trade. 
If the unit labour requirement is increasing in the sector  for the home country  
and decreasing in the sector  for the foreign country, that is, the home country has a 
comparative advantage in sector  and the foreign country has a comparative 
advantage in sector  , social welfare is also U-shaped in the trade cost. As in 
the featureless economy, there are gains from trade even if the products are assumed to 
be homogeneous. Therefore, another source of the gains from trade is confimed to be 
the comparative advantage.  
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Appendix C 
1. To show that the home sales are increasing in the trade costs: . 
Evaluating the first order derivative at  gives: 
 
Evaluating the first order derivative at  gives: 
 
Denote  as , then we have the following quadratic function: 
 
To check if there exist real roots for this function: 
 
Therefore,  and . 
Solving the first-order condition , the two roots are: 
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As the denominator is positive,  . 
Suppose that , then we must have: 
 
Simplify the left-hand-side of inequality above:
, which is positive. Therefore, it can be shown 
that . 
 is monotonically increasing in  when the trade costs are positive. 
 is proved.  
2. To show that the exports are decreasing in the trade costs: . 
Evaluating the first order derivative at  gives: 
 
Evaluating the first order derivative at  gives: 
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Solving the first-order condition , the two roots are: 
        
 
 
 
2
1
22 2 4 2 2
2 2
2
2 2
r bL r bL a bL r a bL
a bL
r bL
t
a bL
r
    



    








 
 
It follows that .  is monotonically decreasing in  when 
the trade costs are positive.  is proved.  
3. To show that the trade costs per-unit of exports are positively related to unit 
labour requirement of exports: . 
Evaluating the first order derivative at  gives: 
 
Evaluating the first order derivative at  gives: 
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There are two possibilities.  
First, assume that . 
We want to show that . Therefore, the following inequality must hold: 
 
Simplify the inequality above gives: 
 
It remains to show that . 
Define , then we have the following quadratic function: 
 
As it is assumed that  and according to (4.2.36), we have the 
range of  ：    
Obtain the axis of symmetry of the parabola:   
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Therefore,   is decreasing in . The last step is to show that  is 
non-positive. 
It can be shown that . Therefore,  and . It turns 
out that  is monotonically increasing in  if . 
Second, assume that . We want to show that  and .  
To show that ,  the following inequality must hold: 
 
and 
. 
It is shown that the axis of symmetry of the parabola is   and 
.Therefore,  is proved, and . 
To show that , we have: 
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compare the denominator,  as  is between 0 and 
1. Calculate the gap between  and , we have: 
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. The numerator of the left-
hand-side exceeds that of the right-hand-side. 2r t  is then proved. 
Therefore,  is also monotonically increasing in  if . 
 must hold for all possible value of . 
4. To show that the aggregate profits are decreasing in t  in the neighbourhood of 
zero trade cost:       
 
First, let  , then 
 can be  
can be rewritten as a function of: 
  
Calculate the discriminant of the quadratic function:
 
Therefore,  and the first order derivative  
5.    To show that social welfare is decreasing in t  in the neighbourhood of zero trade 
cost:  
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We just need to show   or equivalently 
. 
Since , we then show if . Calculate the gap as: 
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Therefore, . 
5.         To check the first-order derivate of social welfare with respect to t  when the 
trade cost is prohibitive: 
First, prove that or equivalently that . 
Since , we then show if . Calculate the gap as: 
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Then we show that >0 
Denote x as , then  can be rewritten 
as : 
 
Obtain the discriminant of the quadratic function: 
 
It follows that >0 
Therefore,  is positive only if when  is 
positive.  
6. To show that h   and t   are positively related
Denote , then the numerator can be expressed as the following function: 
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Obtain the discriminant of the quadratic function: 
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The first order derivative shows: 
 
Therefore,  is decreasing in h and h ranges from 0 to 1. Therefore, we have 
the following inequality: 
 
 is then proved. 
7. To show that the equilibrium wage at zero trade cost is higher than that 
at the prohibitive trade cost:   
Calculate the gap between : 
 
It remains to show that  
According to (4.3.36), we have  
As  
Therefore,  is proved.
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
The welfare comparison between ad valorem and per-unit taxation has been one of 
the oldest issues in public finance. Under Cournot competition, conventional wisdom 
has it that an ad valorem is welfare superior to a per-unit tax. Grazzini (2006) compares 
ad valorem and per-unit taxation in an exchange economy in which oligopolists are 
simultaneously producers and consumers. She claims that, in a general equilibrium 
setting, per-unit taxation can dominate ad-valorem taxation when the number of 
oligopolists is sufficiently low compared to the number of consumers. In this study, it 
is shown that the dominance of which taxation over the other depends on how the social 
welfare is measured. In Grazzini (2006), social welfare is measured by a utilitarian 
social welfare function and the utility function is homogeneous of degree two ( 1 2x x ). 
In section 2.2, the utility function which is homogeneous of degree one is used 
( 1/2 1/2
1 2x x ), which is a monotonic transformation of the utility function used in Grazzini 
(2006). Therefore, it yields the same demands as in Grazzini (2006). It is shown that ad 
valorem taxation is preferred on welfare grounds. To further analyse why the 
exceptional result occurs in Grazzini (2006), a lump-sum transfer is introduced from 
the gainers to the losers in section 2.3, by using some social welfare function in Grazzini 
(2006). It is shown that welfare with ad valorem tax is unambiguously higher than that 
with per-unit tax. It can be concluded that the result in Grazzini (2006) is due to the 
effect of taxation on the redistribution of income rather than from any efficiency gain.  
The implication of this chapter, from a policy perspective, is that an ad valorem tax 
is superior to an equal-yield per-unit tax. This reinforces the conventional wisdom and 
the usual argument. In particular, assuming that the government has the same revenue 
under two forms of taxation, it is shown that the consumers are in favour of ad valorem 
taxation while the oligopolists are better off with per-unit taxation. From the viewpoint 
of the aggregate welfare (i.e., the arithmetic sum of each agent’s utility level), ad 
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valorem dominates per-unit taxation regardless the number of consumers and 
oligopolists. Moreover, if the government can regulate the economy by transferring 
goods from gainers to losers, all players are made better off under ad valorem taxation.  
This suggests that the government should adopt an ad valorem tax. However, the 
analysis of chapter 2 does not provide the necessary condition of the social welfare 
function in which the opposite result in Grazzini (2006) can hold. 
The welfare comparison also applies to the study of international trade and 
conventional wisdom suggests that any positive per-unit tariff can be replaced by an ad 
valorem tariff that yields a higher level of welfare. However, very few studies consider 
the welfare with the two tariffs in the presence of the constraint of FDI cost. The 
proximity-concentration trade-off suggests that the FDI is discouraged when trade costs 
fall and the foreign firms will only choose to undertake FDI if it is more profitable than 
export. It is assumed in chapter 3 that the home government maximises the tariff 
revenue rather than the welfare. As the import tariff revenue is increasing in import 
tariff up to the critical level where the foreign firm is just willing to supply the home 
country by exporting, the maximum-revenue tariff will be at the critical value in which 
the foreign firms can just make positive profits. Given the constraint of FDI cost, the 
maximum revenue collected by the home government is always higher with ad valorem 
tariff under Cournot competition. However, under Bertrand competition with 
differentiated products, the maximum revenue with per-unit tariff is higher than that 
with ad valorem tariff if the FDI cost is sufficiently low. This is because when the FDI 
cost is small enough, the critical value of maximum-revenue ad valorem tariff 
implemented by the home government will be very small. The introduction of product 
differentiation and nature of Bertrand competition both intensify the competition and 
lower the prices. Note the tariff revenue in the case of ad valorem tariff is calculated as 
the products of prices, the quantity of exports from the foreign firms and the level of ad 
valorem tariff. As a result, for a small FDI cost, the import revenue will be very small 
in the case of ad valorem tariff. From the viewpoint of welfare, an ad valorem tariff is 
superior to a per-unit tariff for both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly.  
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This welfare dominance of ad valorem tariff given the constraint of FDI cost can 
also be extended to the case that the government maximises the welfare. To begin with, 
encouraging FDI is always not the optimal policy. This is because welfare is increasing 
in the level of import tariff up to the optimal-welfare tariff and as has been shown in 
chapter 3 that the critical value of FDI cost and import tariff are positively related. This 
implies that welfare is also increasing in the level of FDI cost. The welfare with a policy 
of encouraging FDI is equivalent to the welfare with zero FDI cost. Therefore, the 
welfare with any positive value of FDI outweighs the welfare with encouraging FDI. 
In addition, the optimal-welfare tariff may exceed the maximum-revenue tariff under 
both modes of competition. Under per-unit tariff, the tariff revenue rises as the level of 
exports and import tariff increases. Under ad valorem tariff, an increase in the tariff 
revenue is due to a rise in the level of exports and import tariff as well as prices. It is 
shown in chapter 3 that the tariff revenue with an ad valorem tariff is unambiguously 
higher than that with a per-unit tariff in the neighbourhood of the “unconstrained” 
maximum-revenue tariff. One could expect that that, the tariff and welfare gaps between 
the two tariffs are even higher if the FDI cost exceeds the critical value with the 
maximum-revenue tariff. Also, it is noted that the results in chapter 3 could be extended 
to models that allow for different marginal costs for the two firms and have more than 
one firm in each country. However, it is unclear that if the results also apply to a model 
with non-linear demand function.  
 The sign and magnitude of the gains from trade and from a reduction in trade costs 
continue to be among the central issues in international trade. In partial equilibrium, 
welfare as a function of trade costs follows a U-shaped pattern. However, it is of great 
difficulty to embed oligopoly model in general equilibrium. Thus, there is a very limited 
number of studies that analyse the relationship between trade costs and welfare in 
general equilibrium. Chapter 4 adopts the GOLE approach developed by Neary, by 
assuming that firms are large in their own sectors but small in the economy as a whole. 
Therefore, the oligopolists are not able to influence factor rewards because they are 
many in demanding scarce inputs, and they take other good prices and national income 
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as given. This simple assumption permits to have a theory of oligopoly in general 
equilibrium, by also addressing the factors markets. 
It is shown in chapter 4 that social welfare is also U-shaped in the trade cost in 
general equilibrium. In particular, in the featureless economy where the level of 
technology is identical for all firms in two identical countries, there are gains from trade 
if the products are differentiated. With identical products and comparative advantage, 
social welfare with zero trade cost is higher than that with the prohibitive trade cost. 
Therefore, from these two examples, it can be said that gains from trade can be driven 
by love-of-variety and comparative advantage.  
Unlike partial equilibrium, the wage rate is endogenously determined in general 
equilibrium. An increase in wage is driven by a higher labour demand across all sectors. 
It is shown that, when the trade cost is sufficiently high, a reduction in trade cost will 
increase the competitive wage due to the redistribution of labour. Therefore, the 
production costs will increase for firms across all sectors as the cost function is the 
Ricardian cost structure. This will also increase the level of prices. On the other hand, 
the competition effect tends to reduce the price if there is a reduction in trade costs. It 
is shown that the cost effect dominates when the trade cost is sufficiently high while 
the competition effect dominates when the trade cost is low enough. As a result, the 
equilibrium prices as a function of trade costs follows a hump-shaped pattern if the 
products are identical.  
One limitation of this analysis is that the measurement of labour input requirement 
for the two firms is too “specific”, and the comparative advantage is “constant” and will 
not be affected by changing the values of exogenous parameter values. By contrast, 
Neary (2016) assumes that the home sales and the exports are respectively decreasing 
and increasing in sector z  and proves a measure of the technological dissimilarity 
between the two countries (i.e., a measure of comparative advantage) 25 . However, 
                                                             
25 See equation 26 in Neary (2016). 
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though the model involves the comparative advantage in chapter 4.3, it fails to capture 
the relationship between welfare and the degree of comparative advantage, which has 
been done in Neary (2016).
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